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DISASTER JUSTICE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
HUMAN CAPABILITY 
ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK† 
INTRODUCTION 
A funny thing happened on the way to the sumo tournament. As 
expected, I was wowed by the wrestlers’ varicolored robes and plus-
size bodies, but I left more impressed with the bustling spectators and 
their super-sized hearts. In the broad lobbies of Tokyo’s wrestling 
arena, souvenir stands lined the walls, stocked with keychains, sweat 
towels, and bobbleheads featuring all of your sumo heroes. But what 
hooked me—along with dozens of Japanese fans headed for the 
bleachers—was a wooden kiosk at the back where a lady was selling 
jams and chutneys made by farmers in Tohoku, a hilly region to the 
north, which less than a year ago had been pulverized by a monstrous 
earthquake and tsunami. The line for jam and chutney snaked along 
for several meters. Even in a crowded lobby, with the year’s first 
tournament moving into full swing, these folks, through the smallest 
of gestures, wanted to help.1 
Natural disasters affect us this way. They often pull a nation 
together and inspire acts of generosity and good citizenship. But for 
those who study (or have lived through) natural disasters, there is also 
a less encouraging side. Despite the best efforts of individuals and 
their communities, the heaviest burdens of disaster are borne by 
those with the least power—those who, for whatever social and 
economic reasons, are more exposed, more susceptible, and less 
resilient when disaster strikes. Social structures designed to protect 
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expert research assistance provided by Stephen Wussow, Kaile LeBlanc, and Jacquelyn Aaron. 
 1.  Many sumo wrestlers have themselves been active in relief and recovery work related 
to the 2011 disaster. See, e.g., Antoni Slodkowski, Sumo Wrestlers Lift Disaster-Hit City’s Spirit, 
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/18/us-japan-disaster-sumo-
idUSTRE77H0ZZ20110818 (reporting on the sumo wrestlers’ return to the disaster-devastated 
region to train and give back to the community); Brooks Baehr, Konishiki, Sumotori Savior in 
Tsunami Zone, HAWAII NEWS NOW (May 17, 2011), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/ 
story/14664777/konishiki-musashimaru-feed-thousands-of-tsunami-victims (reporting on a sumo 
wrestler’s humanitarian mission to aid tsunami victims still living in emergency shelters).  
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people from discrimination often fracture under the mounting stress. 
Catastrophe is bad for everyone. But it is especially bad for the weak 
and the disenfranchised. That was the case in California’s Loma 
Prieta earthquake in 1989. It was the case in Hurricane Katrina in 
2005. And, sadly, it was the case in the 2011 Japan earthquake, where 
many with lower incomes and skills were pushed into poverty and 
where victims over sixty years old accounted for more than sixty-five 
percent of all deaths.2 
In the United States, “social vulnerability”—the part of a 
community’s susceptibility to harm that can be attributed to 
demographic characteristics—has become a major concern among 
disaster researchers. For reasons I will develop in this Article, social 
vulnerability should become a more prominent concern in our 
nation’s disaster policy. I have written on this topic before, and I call 
it “Disaster Justice.”3 I have noted its relationship to the 
environmental-justice movement and suggested how advocates could 
build on lessons learned in that movement.4 Other legal scholars have 
begun examining disaster justice from various angles.5 The topic 
 
 2.  Noriko Murai, But Is It Not in Fact Leaking a Little?, in TSUNAMI: JAPAN’S POST-
FUKUSHIMA FUTURE at Kindle Locations 1852–56 (Jeff Kingston ed., 2011) (ebook published 
by Foreign Policy), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ebooks/tsunami_japans_post_ 
fukushima_future.  
 3.  See generally ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD (2010).  
 4.  Id. at 116–27; see also Robert R.M. Verchick, Katrina, Feminism, and Environmental 
Justice, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 791 (2007) (examining gender disparity in disaster policy).  
 5.  See, e.g., Jim Chen, Law Among the Ruins, in LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: 
HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008); Daniel A. Farber, Disaster Law and 
Inequality, 25 LAW & INEQ. 297 (2007); DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. 
VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN, DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 203–47 (2d ed. 2012) (examining 
evidence of social vulnerability in a larger context of disaster law and policy); Davida Finger, 
Laila Hlass, Anne S. Hornsby, Susan S. Kuo & Rachel A. Van Cleave, Engaging the Legal 
Academy in Disaster Response, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 211 (2012); Charles W. Gould, 
The Right to Housing Recovery After Natural Disasters, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2009) 
(looking at post-disaster reconstruction from a housing perspective); Sharona Hoffman, 
Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1491 (2009) (exploring how vulnerable populations are affected by disasters); Jonathan P. 
Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery Excludes Those Most 
in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21 (2006) (looking at how disasters affect underserved 
communities); Susan S. Kuo, Speaking in Tongues: Mandating Multilingual Disaster Warnings in 
the Public Interest, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2007) (assessing emergency 
alert systems in bilingual communities); RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, PLAYING THE RACE 
CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS HARDER (2008) (discussing the 
response to Hurricane Katrina); Diane P. Wood, The Bedrock of Individual Rights in Times of 
Natural Disaster, 51 HOW. L. J. 747 (2008) (addressing the role of the courts and rule of law in 
post-disaster communities).  
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appears to be gaining critical mass. If so, we legal scholars can learn a 
lot from our colleagues in the social sciences who have been 
investigating this terrain for more than three decades. 
This Article is about setting the foundation for more detailed 
discussions of disaster justice in the legal setting. To do that, we in the 
legal community need to know more about the social science data 
underlying a community’s disaster risk. We must better understand 
the political and moral implications of a society that allows a “disaster 
underclass” to grow unnoticed in a nation committed to freedom and 
democracy. And we must have some idea of the steps we must take to 
address the problem. 
Part I of this Article investigates the social meaning and 
geographic patterns of disaster. It describes how a testy letter from 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau developed insights about the social causes of 
disaster that are today reflected in disaster research centers and 
policy circles throughout the United States. We will see how social 
scientists—in particular geographer Susan Cutter and her 
colleagues—have come to think of disaster as a “social” phenomenon, 
where demographic characteristics like class and race can influence a 
community’s hazard-risk index as much as its location. Until now, 
most of the legal scholarship in this area (mine included) has relied 
more on selective accounts of disasters than on national or regional 
statistical data. Vivid examples are important—and I offer more in 
this Article—but policymakers also need maps and numbers to make 
their case. The point is to show that disaster policy encompasses many 
aspects of law and policy and must be mainstreamed into many 
sectors of government. 
Part II investigates the social and political meaning of injustice. 
Assuming disasters are all in some way a product of society, I ask if 
the arrangement we have can be considered not just unfortunate, but 
also unjust. The writings of political theorist Judith Shklar and 
economist Amartya Sen help lead this inquiry. Each of them devoted 
years to analyzing the nature of inequality. Perhaps less known, each 
also used examples of natural disaster to hammer down their most 
important points. In particular, Sen’s capability approach offers an 
important framework for seeing social resilience in times of disaster 
as a significant aspect of personal freedom. 
Part III unites the concepts of disaster and justice. It sets forth 
some general principles for developing new policies and using old 
ones to strengthen social resilience in the future. In this Part, I offer 
two concrete policy initiatives that can set us on a course for progress: 
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a federal executive order on disaster justice and a nationally 
consistent disaster-justice mapping tool. 
Before we set off, let us be clear on definitions. This Article 
focuses on “natural disasters.” The International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies defines “disaster” as “[a] sudden, 
calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a 
community or society and causes human, material, and economic or 
environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability 
to cope using its own resources.”6 A “natural” disaster, as I use the 
term, is a calamitous event that is triggered at least in part by a 
natural force—an earthquake, a flood, a hurricane, a drought. We will 
see soon enough that many experts dismiss the possibility of any 
disaster being completely “natural,” but for now we can live with this 
definition. 
In addition, I will often refer to “disaster research” or “disaster 
policy.” Working with three colleagues, I have spent the years since 
Katrina helping to develop the field of “disaster law.”7 Daniel Farber 
has argued that what most characterizes disaster law (and as I use the 
terms, disaster research and disaster policy) is what he calls “the 
Cycle of Disaster Law”—that is, a set of progressive strategies that 
move from mitigation planning, to emergency response, to victim 
compensation, and finally to recovery and rebuilding, which ideally 
feeds back into mitigation planning.8 Figure 1 illustrates what I will 
call the Circle of Risk Management, which will occasionally be 





 6.  What Is a Disaster?, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, 
http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2012).  
 7.  See generally FARBER ET AL., supra note 5.  
 8.  Daniel A. Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating the Intersection of 
Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 101, 109–10 (2011). 
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Fig. 1. Circle of Risk Management 
I. DISASTER 
A. Misfortune or Injustice? 
You can take all of the bad things that happen in this world and 
throw them into two buckets—one labeled “Misfortune” and the 
other “Injustice.” This is the premise suggested by the political 
theorist Judith Shklar in her famous Storrs Lectures delivered at Yale 
in 1988.9 Though the dichotomy is meant to apply to all human 
miseries, Shklar starts with the example of an earthquake:10 
If the dreadful event is caused by the external forces of nature, it is 
a misfortune and we must resign ourselves to our suffering. Should, 
however, some ill-intentioned agent, human or supernatural, have 
brought it about, then it is an injustice and we may express 
indignation and outrage.11  
By Shklar’s own admission, the distinction in isolation does not 
explain much. That is because “what is treated as unavoidable and 
 
 9.  See generally JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990) (developing the 
thesis presented in the Storrs Lectures, hosted at Yale Law School in 1988).  
 10.  Id. at 1–2.  
 11.  Id. at 1.   
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natural, and what is regarded as controllable and social, is often a 
matter of technology and of ideology or interpretation.”12 It is also a 
matter of how broadly one reads the phrase “ill-intentioned.” While 
that phrase might suggest some form of conscious resolve, Shklar is 
clear that injustice can follow not only from bad intent and 
recklessness, but also from more ambiguous behavior, such as a 
government’s failure to address an inequality or a foreseeable danger. 
“The very distinction between injustice and misfortune can 
sometimes be mischievous,” Shklar writes; “[t]hat something is the 
work of nature or of an invisible social hand does not absolve us from 
the responsibility to repair the damage and to prevent its recurrence 
as much as possible.”13 
But while people might disagree about how to describe a 
particular act or failure to act, Shklar believes the inquiry itself 
reveals a noteworthy pattern, namely: “The perceptions of victims 
and of those who, however remotely, might be victimizers, tend to be 
quite different.”14 It is how we approach that difference that is the key 
to understanding injustice.15 
In less than a paragraph, Shklar has pruned back the ethical 
thicket to two branches: agency and perspective. Injustice, in political 
terms, demands an accountable party, or in moral terms, someone to 
blame. Whether an agent should be held culpable in either sense will 
involve a set of interrelated questions touching on causation, 
foreseeability, intent, duty to others, and so on. Such inquiries, as 
Shklar implies, rely on scientific and social investigations (where 
social investigation would include applications of “ideology or 
interpretation”).16 If the agent is within a government’s jurisdiction 
(by which I mean to exclude the supernatural and other parties 
 
 12.  Id.  
       13.    Id. at 50. Shklar evidently believed there was a thin line between a blameworthy failure 
and a reasonable omission. As she notes later, “Next to guilt, the most truly unjust and 
unwarranted response to accidents and disasters is scapegoating." Id. at 60. While the distinction 
between blameworthy failure and reasonable omission is important and worthy of study, I will 
not address it here. For the purpose of my argument, it is enough to acknowledge that in many 
cases the social vulnerabilities that increase hazard risks for some populations are rooted in 
known inequalities and that resulting harm in times of disaster is foreseeable. In such cases, a 
government’s failure to act, when examined from the perspective of the injured as well as from 
other vantages, could plausibly be considered unjust. 
 14.  Id. at 1. 
 15.  See id. (“Neither the facts nor their meaning will be experienced in the same way by 
the afflicted as by mere observers or by those who might have averted or mitigated the 
suffering. These people are too far apart to see things in the same way.”).  
      16.    Id. 
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“beyond the law”), it is reasonable to say that justice may require 
state-induced punishment, compensation, or comprehensive reform. 
But determinations of accountability through agency cannot be 
totally objective, as the reference to “ideology” implies. So we require 
a second inquiry, this time an inquiry into human perspective; that is, 
we must determine the vantage from which we assess the scientific 
and social meanings gathered in the first inquiry on agency. 
My purpose in Part I is to examine the agency side of disaster 
(Part II will tackle perspective). When a river leaps its banks and 
sweeps through an Iowa town, sending hundreds to homeless shelters, 
who or what do we attribute that to?17 The rain? The zoning board? 
The homeowners? Society at large? The answer will not necessarily 
draw the line between misfortune and injustice (we need perspective 
for that), but it is the first step in understanding the scope of the 
problem. If the flood of an Iowa town is only a story about rain, there 
is not much beyond meteorology to discuss. If the flood damage is 
traceable to “society at large,” nearly every policy consideration is on 
the table. For decades, the scholarly literature on disaster has been 
moving more toward the “socialization of disaster,” particularly 
stressing the role of social inequality. But expanding the scope of 
agency makes the policy work harder, demanding more knowledge in 
more fields and forcing us to confront the imbalance of social power. 
It is a policy puzzle that traces its roots to the European 
Enlightenment and that today shapes our understanding of 
hurricanes, wildfires, and the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan. 
B. From Rousseau with Love 
Turn back the clock to November 1, 1755. That was the day of 
the Lisbon earthquake, which many experts consider to be “the first 
modern disaster.”18 That morning, on All Souls’ Day, the city was 
rocked by an enormous convulsion, which was soon followed by a 
tsunami and a series of fires. The fabled city was flattened. Up to 
70,000 residents were killed.19 Eighty-five percent of the buildings 
 
 17.  See Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change While Planning 
for Disaster: Footholds, Rope Lines, and the Iowa Floods, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2203 (2011) 
(examining social causes of the 2008 floods in Iowa).  
 18.  See, e.g., Russell R. Dynes, The Dialogue Between Voltaire and Rousseau on the Lisbon 
Earthquake: The Emergence of a Social Scientific View, 18 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & 
DISASTERS 97, 97 (2000) (“[I]t is appropriate to call the Lisbon earthquake the first modern 
disaster.”).  
 19.  Id. at 99.  
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were gone.20 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.—father of the famous 
American jurist—captured the scene decades later: 
The ruins of Lisbon burned for six days. . . . The city, according to 
one observer, was reduced to “hills and mountains of rubbish still 
smoking.” A Mr. Braddock, seeking higher ground after 
experiencing a sea wave that accompanied the noon shock, 
described victims with “their backs or thighs broken, others vast 
stones on their breasts, some lay in the rubbish and crying out in 
vain . . . for succour.” Streams of refugees were fleeing the city, and 
the earth was not yet quiet.21 
In the Age of Reason, Lisbon’s unreasonable demise served up a 
case study for public thinkers of many stripes, their arguments taking 
flight in letters, sermons, newspaper columns, and poems.22 Perhaps 
the most memorable exchange occurred between Voltaire and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. That conversation would eventually define the 
way that we—and our public officials—understand natural disasters 
in the twenty-first century.23 
Before getting to that, remember that many, perhaps most, 
ordinary Europeans believed the earthquake was literally an act of 
God—a punishment, most likely, for the sins of an extravagant city.24 
Many clergy supported the theory.25 Gabriel Malagrida, a Jesuit 
preacher, is credited with persuading crowds of residents to renounce 
past frivolity and to repent—at least until the Prime Minister, the 
 
 20.  LUCIEN G. CANTON, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES FOR 
EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS 12 (2007).  
 21.  VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, First of November: The 
Earthquake Day, (undated) (second ellipsis in original) available at 
http://www.phenomena.org.uk/earthquakes/earthquakes/lisbon.html). One of Holmes’s best-
known poems, “The Deacon’s Masterpiece,” offers a less serious take on that earthquake. See 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Deacon’s Masterpiece, or The Wonderful One-Hoss Shay, in 
ILLUSTRATED POEMS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 68, 68 (Macmillan and Co. 1885).  
 22.  Dynes, supra note 18, at 99.  
 23.  Some historians have wondered whether the Lisbon earthquake deserves the credit it 
often is given for prompting a cultural debate about the origins of natural disasters and other 
misfortunes. See, e.g., Robert H. Brown, “The Demonic” Earthquake: Goethe’s Myth of the 
Lisbon Earthquake and Fear of Modern Change, 15 GERMAN STUD. REV. 475, 478 (1992) 
(noting that skepticism toward theodic explanations for disaster pre-dates the Lisbon quake). 
Still, the symbolic importance of the earthquake in western thought is “undisputed.” Kristian 
Cederval Lauta, Exceptions and Norms: The Law on Natural Disasters 43 n.42 (2012) 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation on file with the author); see also Dynes, supra note 18, at 99 
(associating the Lisbon quake with an eruption of metaphysical debate in “popular literature” 
throughout Europe).  
 24.  See Dynes, supra note 18, at 99 (noting that “[m]any of the themes” in the popular 
literature of the time “involved the idea that Lisbon was being punished for its sins, although 
such a case had its limits” and that “some saw the city as wicked, materialistic, and immoral”). 
 25.  T. D. KENDRICK, THE LISBON EARTHQUAKE 39 (1955). 
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Marquis de Pombal, had him executed.26 Leibnitz, whose writings 
approached rationalism from a Christian perspective, embraced the 
central fairness of a numinous world; he sought to minimize the 
quake’s importance by emphasizing instead the destructive power of 
human evil over acts of God. “A single Caligula, a Nero,” he wrote in 
1710, “has done more evil than an earthquake.”27 Alexander Pope 
gave Leibnitz’s view a lyrical voice, arguing in verse that earthquakes 
and other natural calamities could not undercut the essential order of 
God’s unfathomable love, stating: “One truth is clear, Whatever is, is 
RIGHT.”28 
Voltaire had politely dismissed such treacle for years, but after 
the great quake, he finally lost his cool. In a blistering poem called 
“The Lisbon Earthquake,” Voltaire railed against any attempt to find 
justice or reason amid crumpled towers and “[w]omen and children 
heaped up mountain high.”29 Voltaire made clear that Germany’s 
favorite humanist was running on empty: 
Leibnitz can’t tell me from what secret cause                                      
In a world governed by the wisest laws,                                      
Lasting disorders, woes that never end                                           
With our vain pleasures, real sufferings blend;                                       
Why ill the virtuous with the vicious shares?                                   
Why neither good nor bad misfortunes spares?                                    
I can’t conceive that “what is, ought to be.”30 
Rousseau had great affection for the elder Voltaire. But the 
poem troubled him deeply. He thought the poet was missing 
something and told him so in a protracted letter of near-Proustian 
density—a document that would become a classic in the field of 
disaster studies.31 Despite the occasional earthquake or tsunami, 
Rousseau argued that “[m]ost of our physical ills are still our own 
work.”32 “Nature,” he reminded Voltaire, “did not construct twenty 
thousand houses of six to seven stories [in Lisbon].”33 “[I]f the 
inhabitants of this great city had been more equally spread out and 
 
 26.  Dynes, supra note 18, at 99; SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 52.  
 27.  GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ, THEODICY 138 (Austin M. Farrer ed., E.M. 
Huggard trans., Cosimo Classics 2010) (1710).  
 28.  ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON MAN 9 (The Echo Library 2007) (1734). 
 29.  VOLTAIRE, THE LISBON EARTHQUAKE 8 (E.R. Dumont 1901) (1755).  
 30.  Id. at 16.  
      31.  See Dynes, supra note 18, at 112 (describing view among social scientists that 
Rousseau’s letter contains the “beginnings of a social science view of disaster” and noting that it 
prefigured current perspectives on disasters by 200 years). 
 32.  Id. at 106 (quoting Rousseau’s letter).  
 33.  Id.  
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more lightly lodged,” he continued, “the damage would have been 
much less and perhaps of no account.”34 Rousseau went on to 
speculate how residents’ slow evacuation (“because of one wanting to 
take his clothes, another his papers, another his money”) likely 
contributed to the death toll.35 He criticized Voltaire for focusing so 
much on the destruction of a rich city—and one in which much of the 
damage occurred in wealthy neighborhoods—rather than on other, 
less sensational disasters. “You might have wished . . . that the quake 
had occurred in the middle of a wilderness,” he wrote, “[b]ut we do 
not speak of them, because they do not cause any harm to the 
Gentlemen of the cities, the only men of whom we take account.”36 
Then, rhetorically: “Should it be, that nature ought to be subjected to 
our laws, and that in order to interdict an earthquake, we have only to 
build a city there?”37 
Voltaire never responded to Rousseau’s concerns, dismissing 
their verbal jousts as “amusements.”38 But their conversation and its 
historical setting illustrate the ways in which educated people thought 
about disaster. Leibnitz represents the notion of divine justice, or 
theodicy. When disaster occurs, it should be accepted as either 
punishment or, perhaps, creative destruction. But it will never be 
controlled. In this view, science and engineering can do little to 
mitigate such threats because the true forces can never be 
understood. The path to risk mitigation is theological, not 
technological. Theodicy appears to have been the dominant view of 
large-scale disaster in most civilizations until at least the eighteenth 
century.39 
Voltaire rejected theodicy, resigning himself to a universe that 
was both erratic and heartless. While he celebrated the power of 
reason, Voltaire did not expect to find it steering the cosmos. At 
most, he believed, science and technology could help human beings 
build temporary refuge on an otherwise disorderly planet.40 “We must 
 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Lauta, supra note 23, at 41.  
 40.  Voltaire’s awareness of the limits of reason and science led him to embrace a maxim, 
which he attributes to the prophet Zoroaster and which we might today associate with the 
precautionary principle: “In the doubt whether an action be good or bad, abstain from it.” 
VOLTAIRE, THE WORKS OF VOLTAIRE, VOL. VII (PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY PART 5)  299 
(1764), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3 
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cultivate our garden,” says Voltaire’s hero near the end of Candide.41 
But gardens have gates; beyond them, the woods are just as 
frightening as before. 
Finally, Rousseau offers his own take, which sociologist Russell 
Dynes calls “the first truly social scientific view of disaster.”42 
Catastrophe is driven not by God, or by nature, but by society. By 
insisting that “[m]ost of our physical ills are still our own work,”43 
Rousseau anticipates today’s hazard-mitigation experts by centuries. 
Note Rousseau’s attention to the city’s design and to human 
behavior. He criticizes the concentration of multi-story dwellings near 
the Ribeira Palace, the center of government and commerce; the 
irrational behavior of evacuees, putting treasure above survival; and 
(implicitly) journalists’ misplaced emphasis on misfortunes affecting 
the rich and powerful. And for Rousseau—who, in contrast to the 
celebrated Voltaire, toiled in obscurity and poverty—it is not 
surprising to see themes of class pervade each of his insights. 
Rousseau’s argument moves the center of inquiry from the physical 
hazard to the social risk. Understanding physical hazard is the focus 
of Voltaire’s nature-based argument; it suggests an alliance with the 
natural sciences—seismology, climatology, volcanology, and the like. 
Understanding social risk similarly relies on the natural sciences, but 
as we will see, it also requires significant investments in social 
science—psychology, geography, political science, economics—as well 
as a healthy dose of philosophy and ethics. 
The story of Lisbon suggests a progression from theodicy to 
natural science, and later to social science. The city’s destruction 
roused many citizens from a complacency that had allowed them to 
grow too comfortable with aristocracy and vague notions of fate. In 
the aftermath, citizens demanded more of government and began 
 
Ftitle=1660&chapter=202509&layout=html&Itemid=27. He warned against overconfidence in 
science, sometimes making the point with humor, as in this imagined exchange between a 
princess and her reluctant physician: 
Physician: Let nature be your first physician. It is she who made all. Of those who have 
lived beyond a hundred years, none were of the faculty. The king of France has already 
buried forty of his physicians, as many chief physicians, besides physicians of the 
establishment, and others. 
Princess: And, truly, I hope to bury you also. 
VOLTAIRE, THE WORKS OF VOLTAIRE, VOL. VI (PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY PART 4) 169 
(1764), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3 
Ftitle=355&chapter=62762&layout=html&Itemid=27. 
 41.  VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 87 (Stanley Appelbaum ed., Dover Publ’ns 1991) (1759).  
 42.  Dynes, supra note 18, at 106.  
      43.    Id. 
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seeing themselves as agents of change in their environment.44 In 
response, the Marquis de Pombal immersed himself in the practical 
details of reconstruction and launched one of the first scientific 
inquiries into the mechanics of earthquakes.45 “Zoning rules were 
imposed, as were Europe’s first building codes for seismic events.”46  
Danish legal scholar Kristian Lauta has argued that these three 
views describe a Kuhnian “paradigm shift”47 in which the focus of 
disaster management leaps from divine law to natural hazard to social 
risk.48 Without doubt, the trend in American and international 
research leans strongly toward the social mechanism. Assessments of 
today’s disaster risks have, according to sociologist Robert Bolin, 
correctly “shift[ed] the analysis of disasters away from the physical 
hazard agent and a temporally limited view of disasters as ‘unique’ 
events separate from the ongoing social order.”49 British geographer 
Mark Pelling, writing for the United Nations Development 
Programme, dismissed the very notion of a natural disaster, 
explaining that “natural disasters are in fact social disasters waiting to 








 44.  See id. at 113–14 (describing how the Lisbon earthquake strengthened an emerging 
trend toward the “modern state” in which the government “assumed collective responsibility” 
for the consequences of the disaster). 
 45.  VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 1.  
 46.  Id.  
 47.  The term “paradigm shift” was first used by philosopher Thomas Kuhn to describe the 
moment when a discipline’s conceptual continuity is interrupted by a revolutionary insight and 
reframing. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 85 (Otto 
Neurath ed., 1970) (1962) (introducing the term).  
 48.  Lauta, supra note 23, at 39–47.  
 49.  Bob Bolin, Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Disaster Vulnerability, in HANDBOOK OF 
DISASTER RESEARCH 113, 114 (Havidán Rodrìguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli & Russell R. Dynes 
eds., 2007).  
 50. Sammy Zahran, Samuel D. Brody, Walter Gillis Peacock, Arnold Vedlitz & Himanshu 
Grover, Social Vulnerability and the Natural and Built Environment: A Model of Flood 
Casualties in Texas, 32 DISASTERS 537, 555 (2008); see also Bolin, supra note 49, at 114 (quoting 
ENRICO L. QUARANTELLI, DISASTER PREVENTION AND MITIGATION IN LADA: PROBLEMS 
AND OPTIONS IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING IN COMPOSITE COUNTRY 18 (1990) (“[T]here 
can never be a natural disaster; at most there is a conjuncture of certain physical happenings and 
certain social happening.”).  
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Figure 2. The Agents of “Natural Disaster” and Related 
Investigative Disciplines51 
 
But in the broader public debate—particularly in politics—the 
three explanations co-exist. Theodicy may seem old-fashioned, but it 
still blows a loud horn. Christian evangelist Pat Robertson infamously 
attributed the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (which killed more than 
300,000 people) to that nation’s “pact to the devil.”52 In 2011, while 
running for president, Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann suggested 
that Hurricane Irene was God’s way of calling attention to America’s 
economic problems.53 (She later claimed to be joking.54) That same 
year, Texas Governor Rick Perry responded to an outbreak of 
hundreds of wildfires in his state by officially declaring three “Days of 
Prayer for Rain in the State of Texas.”55 After Hurricane Katrina, 
religious leaders from many faiths (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, 
Muslim) hailed the storm as a sign of divine punishment, although 
they did not always agree on what was being punished.56 (The “gay 
 
 51.  This diagram is inspired by Lauta, supra note 23, at 47, Table of Disaster Paradigms 
(associating three stages of disaster understanding with three different epistemological aims).  
 52.  David Waters, Haiti, the Devil and Pat Robertson, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2010, available 
at http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/undergod/2010/01/haiti_the_devil_and_pat_ 
roberton.html.  
 53.  Adam C. Smith, Michelle Bachmann Rally Draws over 1,000 in Sarasota, but some 
Prefer Rick Perry, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/ 
national/hundreds-turn-out-for-bachmann-rally-in-sarasota-but-some-prefer-perry/1188559. 
 54.  Sarah Wheaton & Trip Gabriel, Bachmann Plays Down Comments Linking Disaster 
and Deficits, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2011, 1:41 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/ 
08/29/bachmann-plays-down-comments-linking-disasters-and-deficits.   
 55.  Manny Fernandez, Texas Rally Renews Debate over the Boundaries of Perry’s Faith, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/politics/ 
06perry.html?pagewanted=all.  
 56.  See Michelle Krupa, Pope Promotes Cleric Who Called Katrina God’s Punishment for 
Sin in New Orleans, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 31, 2009, http://www.nola.com/ 
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lifestyle” and U.S. policy in the Middle East were just two of the 
options.57) Around the same time, New Orleans’s own mayor alleged 
that destruction in his city proved that “God was mad at America.”58 
Many citizens seemed to agree. A national poll conducted by ABC 
News after Katrina found that nearly a quarter of those surveyed 
believed hurricanes like Katrina and Rita were “deliberate acts of 
God.”59 
Days after the New Orleans flood, President George W. Bush 
claimed on national television that he did not think anyone could 
have “anticipated the breach of the levees.”60 His uninformed 
statement suggested a world that Voltaire knew well—where nature’s 
force is dazzling and basically unknowable. When Governor Perry 
sought federal aid for combating the 2011 wildfires, he too seemed 
caught off guard. His office emphasized the state’s unprecedented 
drought, the agonizing dry winds, and other phenomena; but the 
governor avoided any conversation about the human factors that 
likely made things worse: his decision to slash local firefighting 
budgets, residential sprawl, and, of course, global warming.61 
Questions of agency linger in Japan as the details of the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident continue to unfold. Early on, 
 
news/index.ssf/2009/01/pope_promotes_cleric_who_calle.html (profiling a Catholic priest, now a 
bishop, who claimed Katrina is punishment for New Orleans’s “tolerance of homosexuality”); 
Brian Kaylor, Fundamentalists View Hurricane Katrina as God’s Punishment, ETHICS DAILY, 
Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.ethicsdaily.com/fundamentalists-view-hurricane-katrina-as-gods-
punishment-cms-6269 (reporting on religious leaders from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths 
who see Katrina variously as punishment for homosexuality, abortion, general “wickedness,” 
and “U.S. support for the withdrawal of Gaza”). For more examples and a thoughtful discussion 
of theodicy, natural disaster, and American politics, see MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL 
OR HIGH WATER:  HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER 179–99 (2006).  
 57.  See Kaylor, supra note 56.  
 58.  Transcript of Mayor Ray Nagin’s Speech, http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/stories/ 
011706_nagin_transcript.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).    
 59.  Shushannah Walshe & Matthew Jaffe, Michelle Bachmann Jokes Hurricane Irene Is 
God’s Warning to Washington; Campaign Says She was Joking, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/michele-bachmann-irene-gods-warning-washington-campaign-
joking/story?id=14404962#.T-XZKI4Zz-A.  
 60.  See Katrina Forecasters Were Remarkably Accurate, NBC NEWS, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9369041/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_road_back/t/katrina-
forecasters-were-remarkably-accurate/#.T-YoDY4Zz-A (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (quoting a 
statement from a news interview).  
 61.  Patrik Jonsson, Politics of Fighting Wildfire: Did Rick Perry’s Texas Do Enough on Its 
Own? (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0909/Politics-of-fighting-
wildfires-Did-Rick-Perry-s-Texas-do-enough-on-its-own; see also Barack Obama Slams Rick 
Perry on Climate Change, Citing Texas Wildfires, POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/truth-
o-meter/statements/2011/sep/28/barack-obama/barack-obama-slams-rick-perry-climate-change-
citin (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).  
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executives at Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) depicted the 
disaster as an unforeseeable event caused almost entirely by a “once 
in a millennium” tsunami.62 But a report released in the summer of 
2012 by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Commission repudiated that version of events.63 Instead the 
Commission found that the plant’s external power lines and “some 
key safety features” were knocked out by the earthquake—a 
predictable event that had not been adequately prepared for—before 
the tsunami waves hit.64 The Commission also cited evidence that the 
earthquake might have caused a dangerous coolant leak in one of the 
reactors.65  Better earthquake standards, the Commission implied, 
could have prevented part of the calamity.66 The report accused 
TEPCO and regulators of ignoring some safety regulations and 
conspiring to “take the teeth out of regulations.”67 An introductory 
statement by the Commission’s chairman went so far as to implicate 
some aspects of Japanese culture, criticizing its “groupism,” its 
tendency to suppress dissent, and its expectation of “reflexive 
obedience.”68 “[Fukushima] was a profoundly manmade disaster – 
that could and should have been foreseen and prevented,” wrote the 
chairman, “[a]nd its effects could have been mitigated by a more 
effective human response.”69 
 Examples like these reveal the contested nature of disaster 
narratives. While researchers and policymakers see disasters as social 
occurrences, elected officials, religious leaders, and others have an 
interest in accessing a wider range of explanations. Some may even 
deploy narratives in cynical ways to direct blame on a disfavored 
group or policy, or to avoid being blamed themselves. Even when a 
narrative is embraced sincerely, it ultimately reflects an ideology 
(religious, scientific, sociological) that cannot be avoided. In this way, 
all disaster narratives feed off the cultural environment and are, as a 
critical theorist might say, “socially constructed.” What is important, 
 
 62.  Hiroko Tabushi, Inquiry Declares Fukushima Crisis a Man-Made Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/world/asia/fukushima-nuclear-crisis-a-man-
made-disaster-report-says.html.  
 63.  FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, 
OFFICIAL REPORT (2012), available at http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf.   
 64.  Id. at 17, 30.  
       65.    Id.  
 66.  Id. at 16.  
 67.  Id. at 20.  
 68.  Id. at 9.  
 69.  Id.  
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in my view, is that researchers cannot just rely on a Kuhnian 
paradigm-leap to catapult disaster law into a social-vulnerability 
mindset. Too many people with influence have too many other 
ideologies and incentives. If we want law to pay more attention to 
social vulnerability, we have to marshal the evidence and the moral 
arguments to build the case. Toward that end, we should examine in 
detail the ways in which social vulnerability contributes to community 
hazard. 
C. Anatomy of a Hazard 
We can think of “community hazard” as a combination of a 
community’s “physical vulnerability” and its “social vulnerability.”70 
Here, “community” means, as a geographer might put it, “the totality 
of social system interactions” contained within a “defined geographic 
space.”71 Depending on one’s interest, that could be anything from a 
neighborhood, a census tract, a city, or a county. Physical 
vulnerability refers to a community’s physical exposure to a place-
based risk—for example, a flood, an earthquake, or a wildfire. 
Physical vulnerability should be read to include “geophysical 
characteristics” (geology, hydrology, climate, and so on), as well as 
important aspects of the built infrastructure that, if they failed, would 
present their own difficulties (such as a dam or a nuclear facility). 
Social vulnerability refers to the susceptibility of a community’s 
population groups to the impacts of a hazard. This susceptibility, as 
Susan Cutter defines it, “is not only a function of the demographic 
characteristics of the population (age, gender, wealth, etc.), but also 
more complex constructs such as health care provision, social capital, 
and access to lifelines (e.g., emergency response personnel, goods, 
services).”72 
 
 70.  Here I am simplifying a relationship originally described by sociologists Susan Cutter 
and Christopher Emrich, aware that my use here is less precise than theirs. See Susan L. Cutter 
& Christopher T. Emrich, Moral Hazard, Social Catastrophe: The Changing Face of 
Vulnerability Along the Hurricane Coasts, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102, 107 fig. 1 
(2006), available at http://ann.sagepub.com/content/604/1/102 (depicting a conceptual framework 
in which “place vulnerability”—what I call “hazard”—follows from “biophysical vulnerability” 
and “social vulnerability,” which in turn follow from a variety of precursors).  
 71.  Susan L. Cutter, Lindsey Barnes, Melissa Berry, Christopher Burton, Elijah Evans, 
Eric Tate & Jennifer Webb, A Place-Based Model for Understanding Community Resilience to 
Natural Disasters, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 598, 599 (2008).   
 72.  Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 103 (citation omitted). My use of the terms 
“physical vulnerability” and “social vulnerability” comes from the social science literature. In 
particular, see id. at 106, which contrasts physical vulnerability and vulnerability from “social 
aspects.” There is, however, some variation among researchers as to what these terms include.  
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There are many ways to nest these terms. The social science 
literature offers a playground of hoops, boxes, and Möbius ribbons to 
help visualize these relationships.73 Sometimes these frameworks 
contradict each other.74 But for our purposes, we can describe the 
relationship of hazard and vulnerabilities as shown in Figure 3 below. 
Fig. 3. Components of Community Hazard75 
 
Note that my use of the term “vulnerability,” whether physical or 
social, suggests a present and future tense: it refers both to a 
community’s ability to withstand an immediate assault and its ability 
to rebound from it afterwards.76 A mobile home park built in a 
 
 73.  See, e.g., id. at 107 fig.1 (depicting a “conceptual framework” illustrating “vulnerability 
of places”); Carl Folke, Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems 
Analyses, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 253, 258 fig.1 (2006) (depicting “nested adaptive renewal 
cycles”); Colin Polsky, Rob Neff & Brent Yarnal, Building Comparable Global Change 
Vulnerability Assessments: The Vulnerability Scoping Diagram, 17 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 
472, 479 fig.4 (2007) (providing an example of a Vulnerability Scoping Diagram).  
 74.  See Cutter et al., Understanding Community Resilience, supra note 71, at 600 fig.1 
(Venn diagrams depicting various and sometimes contradictory understandings of the 
relationship “between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity” within the social science 
literature).  
 75.  I derive this schematic, adding my own modifications, from a more comprehensive 
visual presented in Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 107 (showing a conceptual framework for 
place-based vulnerability).  
 76.  At the risk of confusing readers, I should note that social scientists sometimes use the 
term “vulnerability” only to describe the ability to withstand, and the term “resilience” to 
describe the ability to rebound. See, e.g., Cutter et al., Understanding Community Resilience, 
supra note 71, at 599 (using the terms this way). But the term vulnerability is also sometimes 
used as I do above. See Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 106 (using vulnerability as including 
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floodplain, surrounded by unpaved roads, illustrates physical 
vulnerability in both senses. The park’s physical location puts fragile 
structures in the path of raging water. The unpaved roads, prone to 
washouts, will make it harder for residents to return with the 
equipment needed to rebound and rebuild. If the park’s inhabitants 
are poor and elderly, the community will suffer from social 
vulnerability. Residents who are less physically mobile will be unable 
to secure the patio furniture or rescue the stranded dog. Those 
without cars or extra cash will have trouble evacuating. In the 
aftermath, poor health and fixed incomes will also impede residents’ 
ability to rebound. Because physical and social vulnerability affect all 
stages of a disaster event, from planning to recovery, they form an 
essential aspect of the Circle of Risk Management, introduced 
earlier.77 
Physical and social vulnerabilities obviously interact: sometimes 
a community’s protective physical environment is exploited and 
destroyed because residents are too powerless to do anything about 
it. (Imagine a town where unchecked logging on the outskirts 
increases the risk of mudslides.) And in some communities poverty is 
closely linked to a lack of natural resources and impoverished 
physical surroundings (as in some tribal communities). In this sense—
despite the nomenclature—both types of vulnerability have important 
social dimensions.78 
The community-hazard framework expands the scope of disaster 
policy in significant ways. In this view, the factors are not just 
geophysical; they are also economic, social, and political. They 
involve a community’s natural infrastructure as well as its built 
infrastructure. The protection of soil-stabilizing forests and storm-
slowing coastal marshes becomes an important consideration in 
disaster policy.79 So too do bridge maintenance and regular 
 
from disaster events”); BEN WISNER, PIERS BLAIKIE, TERRY CANNON & IAN DAVIS, AT RISK: 
NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S VULNERABILITY AND DISASTERS 9 (2004) (defining 
vulnerability to include the capacity “to recover from the impact of a natural hazard”).   
 77.  See supra Figure 1.  
 78.  See Cutter et al., Understanding Community Resilience, supra note 71, at 602 (“Natural 
systems, social systems, and the built environment are interconnected and therefore their 
separation is arbitrary. Human actions impact the state of the environment and, in turn, a 
degraded environment provides less protection against hazards.”).  
 79.  See VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 16–24 (describing the importance of natural 
infrastructure in reducing disaster risk and recommending polices to protect this infrastructure); 
see also Cutter et al., Understanding Community Resilience, supra note 71, at 601 (“The 
resilience of a community is inextricably linked to the condition of the environment and the 
treatment of its resources . . . .”).  
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improvements to data and cell-phone networks. This leads us to see 
the relationship between risk-reduction and the broader concept of 
“sustainability.” The framework’s emphasis on the ability to rebound 
as well as withstand reveals the relationship between risk-reduction 
and the broader concept of “resilience” in all its physical, social, and 
economic aspects.80 Within this broader framework—encompassing 
environmental protection, public works, and more—disaster research 
has gradually homed in on one social factor of critical concern: 
inequality. 
D.  The Effects of Social Vulnerability 
Disaster research as an academic discipline developed after 
World War II, prompted by studies of civilian population centers that 
had been subjected to sustained military attacks, including Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki after the U.S. nuclear attacks.81 In 1963, sociologists 
Enrico Quarantelli and Russell Dynes founded the Disaster Research 
Center at Ohio State University. That center, now located at the 
University of Delaware, inspired the formation of several other such 
centers in the United States, establishing the country as an early 
frontrunner in the field.82 In keeping with conventions and funding 
priorities of the time, hardly anyone studied the effects of race or 
class on hazard vulnerability. But there were exceptions. In his 1958 
classic, Tornadoes over Texas, Henry Estille Moore investigated 
twisters in central Texas and noted that African-Americans suffered 
greater losses and higher injury rates than whites.83 Roy Clifford’s 
1956 investigation of the flooding of two Texas-Mexico border towns 
found cultural differences in evacuation behavior, including a greater 
reluctance within the Mexican community to accept “‘official’ 
warnings and aid.”84 
 
 80.  I use “resilience” here in the simple dictionary sense of “an ability to recover from or 
adjust easily to misfortune or change.” Resilience Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1060 (11th ed. 2004). In the social science literature on disaster, the 
term, while used in more specialized ways, is also confusing. See Cutter et al., Understanding 
Community Resilience, supra note 71, at 599 (“Like vulnerability, multiple definitions of 
resilience exist within the literature, with no broadly accepted single definition.” (citations 
omitted)); id. at 600 (“The relationship between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity 
is still not well articulated . . . .”).   
 81.  BOLIN, supra note 49, at 119.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  HARRY ESTILLE MOORE, TORNADOS OVER TEXAS: A STUDY OF WACO AND SAN 
ANGELO IN DISASTER 146–52 (1958).   
     84.   See ROY A. CLIFFORD, THE RIO GRANDE FLOOD: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
BORDER COMMUNITIES IN DISASTER 76–77 (1956), available at http://archive.org/stream/ 
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In the 1970s, a new agenda for hazards research turned a 
spotlight on racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic differences in disaster 
response and recovery. An important 1977 study investigating a 
catastrophic flood in South Dakota was among the first to examine 
the role of class and other characteristics in people’s ability to find 
temporary housing.85 Disaster researchers since then have published a 
variety of quantitative and statistical analyses that examine social 
characteristics as they relate to disaster. 
Their studies show that at nearly every point along the Circle of 
Risk Management, social vulnerability loads the dice.86 The literature 
tells us that low-income and minority populations are less likely to be 
prepared when disasters hit. Both groups are less likely to have first-
aid kits, emergency food supplies, fire extinguishers, or evacuation 
plans.87 They are similarly less likely to hold earthquake or flood 
insurance.88 Studies also show social differences related to 
communications and response. Some suggest that minority and low-
income households are less likely to receive official disaster warnings 
or even believe them.89 When they do, they are less likely to act upon 
them.90 This seems particularly true of evacuation orders, which 
require resources (transportation, cash, a place to stay) that are less 
common in disadvantaged populations. Federal and local evacuation 
planning has long underestimated the needs of those without private 
transportation and has proven terribly inadequate for the elderly, the 
poor, and the disabled.91 
 But it is the research on physical impacts that is particularly 
devastating. Studies consistently show that in a disaster, poor people 
 
riograndefloodco00clifrich#page/n1/mode/2up. Clifford’s study focused on the towns of Eagle 
Pass, located in Maverick County, Texas, and Piedras Negras, located in the Mexican state of 
Coahuila. Id. at 7. Of the residents in Eagle Pass, 77% had “Spanish surnames” and about 25% 
were foreign-born. Id. The town’s culture reflected what Clifford described as “Mexican ways of 
life . . . intermeshed with English and ‘Anglo’ customs.” Id. In contrast, the residents of Piedras 
Negras, were nearly all Hispanic and born in Mexico. In addition to differences in ethnicity and 
culture, Clifford noted that the average income in Eagle Pass was thought to be much higher 
than in Piedras Negras. Id. at 7–8. The levels of education were roughly the same. Id. at 7. 
 85.  See J. EUGENE HAAS, ROBERT W. KATES & MARTYN J. BOWDEN, RECONSTRUCTION 
FOLLOWING DISASTER 176–77 (1977).  
 86.  See supra Figure 1.  
 87.  Zahran et al., supra note 50, at 539.  
 88.  Id. at 539–40.  
 89.  Id. at 540.   
 90.  Id.  
 91.  For more on the inadequacy of evacuation planning, see ROBERT D. BULLARD & 
BEVERLY WRIGHT, THE WRONG COMPLEXION FOR PROTECTION:  HOW THE GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO DISASTER ENDANGERS AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 280–87  (2012).  
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and people of color are more likely to suffer property damage, injury, 
and death.92 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for instance, the 
damaged areas of New Orleans were 75% African-American, while 
undamaged areas were 46.2% African-American.93 Reported deaths 
in New Orleans were nearly proportional to the city’s racial 
demographics.94 But often that is not the case. Examining 832 floods 
in Texas from 1997 to 2000, a research team led by demographer 
Sammy Zahran found that a one unit increase in the level of social 
vulnerability in a county raised the odds of death or injury by 42.4%.95 
Inadequate preparation and evacuation plans are just part of the 
problem. The most significant factor, the literature suggests, is that 
low-income and minority populations are simply more likely to live in 
older, denser, disaster-prone neighborhoods, with shoddy housing 
and inadequate services.96 
Research also documents important disparities in the recovery 
process. After Katrina, the Bush administration suspended federal 
wage protections and federal affirmative-action policies in affected 
states, ostensibly to stimulate clean-up and reconstruction.97 But the 
controversial policy had a punishing effect on the local workforce.98 
Government assistance programs—often crucial in the wake of a 
large catastrophe—tend to favor middle-class homeowners over less 
 
 92.  Id. at 94–99. “On the physical consequences of Hurricane Audrey (June 1957), Bates 
et al. (1962) discovered significantly higher death rates for Blacks (322 deaths per 1,000) 
compared to Whites (38 deaths per 1,000). Wright et al. (1979) find [sic] that lower income 
households experience significantly higher rates of injury, particularly with regard to flood and 
earthquake events. Numerous studies indicate that socially vulnerable populations suffer 
greater property loss in disaster events. Scholars theorize that minority citizens are affected 
unevenly by disasters because they are more likely to reside in older, poorer, high-density, 
segregated, and disaster-prone areas (Foley, 1980; Bolin, 1986; Bolin and Bolton, 1986; 
Cochrane, 1975; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Massey and Denton, 1993; Phillips, 1993; Phillips 
and Ephraim, 1992; Peacock and Girard, 1997; Charles, 2003; Peacock, Dash and Zhang, 2006).” 
Zahran, et al., supra note 50, at 540.   
 93.  MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER 
AND RACE AFTER KATRINA 9 (2006), available at http://www.hefn.org/resources/files/ 
In%20the%20Wake%20of%20the%20Storm.pdf. In the larger metropolitan area, damaged 
areas were 45.8% African-American, while undamaged areas were only 26.4% African-
American. Id.  
 94.  VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 130.  
 95.  Zahran et al., supra note 50, at 552.  
 96.  Id. at 540.   
 97.  NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE 410 (2007). 
 98.   See generally Haley E. Olam & Erin S. Stamper, The Suspension of the Davis Bacon 
Act and the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 24 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L. J. 145 (2006) (explaining how the suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act estranged 
local workers and exploited migrant workers).  
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affluent renters or the homeless. Studies following the 1989 Loma 
Prieta Earthquake in the San Francisco Bay area have documented 
the many ways that federal assistance programs failed to meet the 
needs of the homeless, Latino farm workers, and low-income African-
Americans.99 Louisiana’s post-Katrina assistance programs raised 
similar concerns. Using federal funds, the state developed programs 
to promote the construction of rental housing and to compensate 
homeowners for the costs of rebuilding. Because of funding 
limitations, the rental-repair programs were only able to support the 
repair of less than one-third of the 82,000 rental units lost to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.100 As for homeowners, nearly three-
quarters of Road Home applicants had gaps between the received 
rebuilding resources and the actual costs of repair.101 The average 
shortfall for African-Americans was roughly $8000 more than it was 
for whites.102 This discrepancy was caused by the grant formula, which 
was based on a home’s pre-storm value, and African-Americans often 
lived in housing markets with depressed values.103 
Poor people and people of color also tend to suffer more 
psychological effects from disaster than victims who are wealthier or 
white.104 According to the literature, “poor, minorities, and single 
mothers may already feel a lack of control over their lives, and the 
dislocation and increased uncertainty about the future add to 
underlying and persistent stress.”105 Elderly African-Americans, in 
particular, have been found to recover more slowly from 
“psychosocial” trauma than whites, an effect partially attributable to 
financial insecurity.106 
 
 99.  BOLIN, supra note 49, at 122. For more on the Loma Prieta Earthquake and social 
vulnerability, see VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 110.   
 100. See KALIMA ROSE, ANNIE CLARK & DOMINIQUE DUVAL-DIOP, A LONG WAY HOME: 
THE STATE OF HOUSING RECOVERY IN LOUISIANA 2008, at 15 (2008), available at 
http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%7B97c6d565-bb43-406d-a6d5-eca3bbf35af0%7D/ 
EQUITYATLAS.PDF (“[O]nly 1 in 3 affordable rentals in the New Orleans area will be 
replaced.”).  
 101.  Id. at 42.  
 102.  See id. (showing graphically that the average estimated gap for African-Americans was 
$39,082 and the average estimated gap for whites was $30,863.).  
 103.  Hurricane Katrina, of course, launched an armada of studies on disaster and social 
vulnerability. For a discussion of the many ways that people’s experiences in disasters are 
affected by class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, and other factors, see VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 
113–29.  
 104.  PASTOR ET AL., supra note 93, at 22 (citing studies).  
    105.   Id. 
 106.  Id.  
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While social scientists emphasize the vulnerabilities of race and 
class, we should not forget that other demographic characteristics are 
also important. Age is often a big factor. Because the elderly tend to 
have more health problems, reduced mobility, and fixed incomes, 
they are often at higher risk of death or injury during disasters. 
Following the 2003 European heat wave, which killed an estimated 
70,000 people, the World Health Organization reported that “in 
European cities, the elderly suffered the greatest effects of heat-
waves,” adding that elderly women bore a higher risk of dying than 
elderly men.107 In New Orleans, the elderly made up 60 percent of 
Katrina’s death toll.108 In its investigation of fatalities from the 2011 
Japan tsunami, the Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, estimated 
that more than 65 percent of those who died were over sixty years 
old.109 Children also tend to be more vulnerable in times of disaster 
and recovery. Physically, their smaller bodies put them at higher risk 
for allergies, infections, malnutrition, and other problems.110 Children 
recovering from disasters often require emotional support and 
counseling to help them process confusing or frightening 
experiences.111  
Gender can also play a key role. Women, for instance, were hit 
particularly hard by Hurricane Katrina. Of the 180,000 Louisianans 
who lost their jobs after the storm, 103,000—or 57 percent—were 
female.112 Of the thousands of households that lost public housing 
services in New Orleans when they were summarily closed after the 
storm, 88 percent were headed by women.113 Men’s median annual 
income rose after the storm, in part due to the rise in heavy-labor jobs 
like demolition and construction.114 Women, who were more likely to 
 
 107.  Heat Threatens Health: Key Figures for Europe, WORLD HEALTH ORG. REG’L OFFICE 
FOR EUR., http://www.euro.who.int/en/what-we-do/health-topics/environment-and-health/ 
Climate-change/activities/prevention,-preparedness-and-response/heathealth-action-plans/heat-
threatens-health-key-figures-for-europe (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).   
 108.  VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 130. 
 109.  Murai, supra note 2, at 1852–56. 
 110.  See VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 140–41 (discussing children’s health issues after 
hurricane Katrina).  
   111. U.S. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN DISASTERS 6 (2d ed. 2000), 
available at http://cretscmhd.psych.ucla.edu/nola/Video/MHR/Governmentreports/Psychosocial 
%20Issues%20for%20Children%20and%20Adolescents%20in%20Disasters.pdf. 
 112.  SARAH VAILL, WOMEN’S FUNDING NETWORK & MS. FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN, 
THE CALM IN THE STORM: WOMEN LEADERS IN GULF COAST RECOVERY 3 (2006). 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id.  
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work in the healthcare, education, and hospitality sectors, saw their 
median income decline.115 Such widespread destruction, of course, 
dramatically increased stress within families, predictably leading to 
soaring reports of domestic violence.116 Indeed, research shows that 
evacuations and disasters are often accompanied by increases in 
violence against women and girls.117 
E. The Distribution of Social Vulnerability 
Although the abovementioned studies are invaluable, the big 
picture is still missing. Many of the studies focused on single events or 
small sets of events. Often they operated at the household or 
individual level. Few of them addressed larger features of the social 
and physical environment that were shared by all residents of a 
locality, such as climate, latitude, public services, and socioeconomic 
characteristics. Then, in the 1990s, a new wave of researchers pulled 
the camera back and captured a larger scene. 
 Their method, called “aggregate analysis,” sought to capture 
the hazard risk of a whole community by combining a series of 
variables related to physical and social vulnerability, from geography 
to climate, from income and education levels to race and age. If 
performed systematically, these analyses could then be compared 
across the country. The hope was to develop a rough portrait of 
disaster risk in America. Geographer Susan Cutter is a leader in the 
field of “vulnerability science.”118 Her work over three decades has 
informed researchers and policymakers around the world. In 2003, 
she and her colleagues used aggregate-analysis techniques to develop 
a “social vulnerability index” (SoVI) to compare disaster risks in 
communities across the country.119 
 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Suzanne Batchelor, Assault Risk Rises in Jammed Post-Katrina Homes, WENEWS 
(June 22, 2006), http://womensenews.org/story/rape/060622/assault-risk-rises-in-jammed-post-
katrina-homes#.UJb_kWdqN-Q.  
 117. See, e.g., BARBARA GAULT ET AL., THE WOMEN OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE GULF 
COAST:  MULTIPLE DISADVANTAGES AND KEY ASSETS FOR RECOVERY PART I. POVERTY, 
RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS 5 (2005), available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-
women-of-new-orleans-and-thegulf-coast-multiple-disadvantages-and-key-assets-for-recovery-
part-i-poverty-race-gender-and-class (using 2004 figures); VAILL, supra note 112, at 10 (noting 
an “increase in domestic violence after the storms”).  
 118.  Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 102.  
    119.  Susan L. Cutter, Bryan J. Boruff & W. Lynn Shirley, Social Vulnerability to 
Environmental Hazards, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 242, 254 (2003) 
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Cutter’s team began by collecting socioeconomic data for 1990 
for all 3141 counties in the United States.120 Starting with more than 
250 variables, they winnowed the field (through various statistical 
means) to forty-two independent variables—a set representing all 
factors identified in past vulnerability research.121 The team identified 
a subset of the eleven most important variables, which “explained 
76.4 percent of the total variance among all counties.”122 They were: 
(1) personal wealth, (2) age, (3) density of the built environment, (4) 
single-sector economic dependence, (5) housing stock and tenancy, 
(6) race—African-American, (7) ethnicity—Hispanic, (8) ethnicity—
Native American, (9) race—Asian, (10) occupation, and (11) 
“infrastructure dependence” (as in being employed by a 
transportation service or public utility).123 Weighting each variable 
equally, they developed an index of social vulnerability for each 
county. 
On this basis, Cutter’s team found that “[a]s expected, the vast 
majority of U.S. counties exhibit moderate levels of social 
vulnerability.”124 But some regions carried higher risk. With a few 
notable exceptions, the most vulnerable communities were located in 
the southern half of the country, stretching from southern California 
to Florida.125 These regions not only had greater racial and ethnic 
variation but were also growing quickly, resulting in a crowded, flimsy 
housing stock.126 The least vulnerable counties were located mainly in 
New England, along the eastern slopes of the Appalachian 
Mountains, and in the Great Lakes Region.127 In all, 12.5 percent of 
U.S. counties were deemed “most vulnerable.”128 New York County 
(otherwise known as Manhattan) ranked first in vulnerability due to 
density as well as its racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic profiles.129 
Other high-risk counties included San Francisco County, Bronx 
County, and Benton County—home of the Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation—the economy of which was dominated by a single public 
 
    120.    Id. at 249 
 121.  Id. at 249, 251; Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 106 (describing the 2003 study).  
 122.  Cutter et al., supra note 119, at 251.  
 123.  Id. at 252 tbl.3.  
 124.  Id. at 255.  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. For a map showing variations among all counties, see id. at 255 fig.2.  
 127.  Id. at 256.  
 128.  Id. at 255.  
 129.  Id. at 255; Susan L. Cutter & Christina Finch, Temporal and Spatial Changes in Social 
Vulnerability to Natural Hazards, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2301, 2303 (2008).  
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utility.130 The safest bets, like Poquoson, Virginia, or Tolland, 
Connecticut, were more homogenous and often presented a face that 
was more “suburban, wealthy, white, and highly educated.”131 
Cutter later used the SoVI (with some modifications—notably, 
gender was added) to examine historical changes in countrywide 
vulnerability from 1960 to 2000.132 She wanted to know if the nation 
had become more or less vulnerable, and how variations among 
regions had changed. Cutter’s conclusions, published in 2008, are 
encouraging, but not completely so. Cutter and her co-author 
Christina Finch found that during the forty-year period, the factors 
that most consistently distinguished counties from their peers were 
density, race/ethnicity, and “socioeconomic status” (a term 
encompassing income, education level, home ownership, and other 
related characteristics).133 This is good news in the sense that 
researchers concerned with the drivers of inequality have at least 
been focusing on the right things. In addition, Cutter and Finch 
identified a “steady reduction of social vulnerability” overall in the 
United States.134 Colored maps in their report show bright red 
splotches (indicating the most vulnerable counties) over the 
Southwest, the upper Great Plains, the Lower Mississippi, Florida, 
and Hawai’i gradually fading to pink, or better, shifting to blue as the 
decades unfold.135 In 1960, the most socially vulnerable populations 
were nested in the Deep South (for reasons of race, gender, and 
socioeconomic status), the Southwest (Native American country), 
and Florida (high elderly population).136 By 2000, the nation’s total 
social vulnerability had declined, but significant concentrations 
existed in the lower Mississippi Valley, the South Texas border lands, 
California’s Central Valley, and the upper Great Plains.137 
Most intriguing, Cutter and Finch were able to use these historic 
trends to project future distributions of social vulnerability. 
Extrapolating from the trends of 1960 to 2000, they imagined what 
the year 2010 would look like. Their projection showed continued 
problems in the Mississippi Valley, in the Southwest, and in 
 
 130.  Cutter et al., supra note 119, at 255–56.  
 131.  Id. at 256.   
 132.  Cutter & Finch, supra note 129, at 2301–02.  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 2301.  
 135.  Id. at 2303 fig.1.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 2302.  
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California, but they also found that the upper Great Plains would 
remain the most dominant area of social vulnerability.138 The least 
socially vulnerable counties, according to their calculations, would be 
located in Colorado, Nevada, and Idaho.139 (Now that actual data for 
2010 are available, Cutter has plans to verify these projections.140) 
It is important to note that these studies from 2003 and 2008 only 
examined social vulnerability. They did not consider the geophysical 
hazards associated with individual counties to see how residents’ 
social vulnerability might be put to the test. Geographers are now 
examining these overlaps, too. After Katrina, for instance, Cutter and 
a colleague reexamined past social-vulnerability trends for the 
hurricane-ravaged parishes or counties in Louisiana, Alabama, and 
Mississippi.141 They found that in 2000, Orleans Parish (where the city 
of New Orleans is located) had “the highest social vulnerability score 
of all Katrina-impacted coastal parishes or counties.”142 In fact, 
Orleans Parish was the only Katrina-impacted parish or county in 
those three states with a social vulnerability score that had actually 
increased in the forty years since 1960.143 
In a more comprehensive study of geophysical and social 
overlaps, geographers Bryan Boruff, Christopher Emrich, and Susan 
Cutter combined a coastal erosion index developed by the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) with a variant of the SoVI.144 They were 
interested in how much geophysical vulnerability and social 
vulnerability each contributed to relative vulnerabilities of coastal 
counties.145 Looking at all U.S. coastal counties (except for those on 
the Great Lakes and in Alaska and Hawai’i), they found a 
remarkable pattern. In the counties along the Pacific and Atlantic 
coasts, the vulnerability of coastal communities was most influenced 
by physical characteristics like relative sea-level rise, wave height, and 
shoreline erosion.146 But in the Gulf Coast region, community 
 
 138.  See id. at 2303 fig.1 (showing mapped projection for 2010).  
 139.  See id. (showing mapped projection for 2010).  
 140.  Id. at 2305.  
 141.  Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 105.  
 142.  Id. at 107.  
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Bryan J. Boruff, Christopher Emrich & Susan L. Cutter, Erosion Hazard Vulnerability 
of US Coastal Counties, 21 J. COASTAL RES. 932, 932 (2005).  
 145.  Researchers used two statistical techniques to determine the relative influence of 
physical factors and social factors in variations among the counties. For a description of their 
method, see id. at 935.  
 146.  Id. at 939.  
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vulnerability was mostly determined by social characteristics like 
poverty, age, population density, and race.147 In Orleans Parish—an 
area that is world-famous for its precarious physical geography—
analysis showed that social factors made an equal contribution to the 
parish’s overall vulnerability index.148 
F. Crisis, What Crisis? 
In the spring of 2003, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 
Baghdad, television reports showed thousands of looters ransacking 
hospitals, schools, and the city’s many cultural treasures, including 
Iraq’s celebrated National Museum.149 Speaking at a press conference, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld first tried to minimize the 
violence. Then he appeared to justify it, suggesting that the 
maelstrom was “part of the price” of political liberation.150 Then in a 
fit of pique, he pronounced the euphemism for which the Secretary 
will always be known: “Stuff happens.”151 The message was simple: 
We are in a crisis here. The stakes are high and the consequences of 
our actions are hard to predict. You will not like everything you see 
happening, but the normal rules no longer apply. We are doing the 
best we can. Back off. 
Secretary Rumsfeld was making the case for “crisis”—an 
extreme break from society’s normal pattern. In a crisis, it is hard to 
hold an individual or government accountable because the 
consequences are unpredictable and government is barely in control. 
In times of real emergency, public officials justifiably wrest back 
control by imposing order and restricting freedoms in ways that 
would be unacceptable in other times. Such is the idea behind John 
Locke’s famous “prerogative” by which a ruler may condone the 
destruction of “an innocent man’s house” to prevent the spread of 
 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 109–10 (describing findings from Boruff, Emrich, 
and Cutter’s 2005 study).  
 149.  John F. Burns, A Nation at War: Looting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/world/a-nation-at-war-looting-pillagers-strip-iraqi-museum-
of-its-treasure.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (reporting the looting of museums); Baghdad 
Looting Continues, VOICE OF AMERICA, Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-
a-2003-04-12-29-baghdad-67458862/385490.html (reporting the looting of museums, schools, 
hospitals, and foreign embassies). 
 150.  Sean Loughlin, Rumsfeld on Looting in Iraq: ‘Stuff Happens,’ CNN.COM (Apr. 11, 
2003), http://articles.cnn.com/2003-04-11/us/sprj.irq.pentagon_1_looting-defense-secretary-
donald-rumsfeld-coalition-forces?_s=PM:US.   
 151.  Id.  
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fire.152 The so-called Lockian Prerogative is today preserved in various 
laws permitting government discretion in “states of emergency.”153 
After the fall of Baghdad, Secretary Rumsfeld never did 
convince his critics; ultimately, they saw Iraqi violence less as an 
unpredictable crisis and more as a foregone conclusion.154 After years 
of study and mapping exercises, today’s geographers see most natural 
disasters the same way. Disasters are “socialized” catastrophes. They 
are seen not as random physical events of unavoidable misfortune, 
but as events with a deep social aspect involving policy choices, 
economics, and cultural behavior. More than ever before, their 
consequences can often be anticipated. Both the physical 
vulnerability and the social vulnerability of community risk have 
social dimensions. Physical vulnerability may include building 
standards, the state of roads and bridges, or the health of coastal 
wetlands. Social vulnerability is affected by socioeconomics, 
demographic characteristics, and similar factors. 
This insight leads to a few points. First, if disaster risk has a social 
dimension, law and policy have a legitimate—even mandatory—role 
in managing it. Second, that management role is broad: it is not just 
about managing physical exposure (one piece of community 
vulnerability), but also about managing social vulnerability in its 
many aspects. Indeed, reducing hazard risk by addressing social 
vulnerability can in some cases be more efficient than attempting to 
reduce it by narrower, more traditional means. Educating or 
empowering a poor community, for instance, might be cheaper and 
might save more homes than building another storm pump or seawall 
in a more affluent area. The same idea goes for maintaining natural 
infrastructure like wetlands or forest buffers. Preserving these areas 
can be a more efficient way of “buying” security in some cases. Third, 
social vulnerability, as Susan Cutter says, is rooted in social 
inequality. So in a very basic way, increasing community resilience is 
about fighting injustice. What we mean by that is the subject of Part 
II. 
 
 152.  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 159 (1689, 1998); see also 
Lauta, supra note 23, at 75–76 (describing the Lockean Prerogative).  
 153.  For an introduction to the law of federal emergency response, see FARBER ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 135–49. 
 154.  See, e.g., Frank Rich, Opinion, Stuff Happens Again in Bagdad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 
2006, at WK12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opinion/24rich.html (“Our 
blindness back in April 2003 seems ludicrous in retrospect.”).  
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II. JUSTICE 
A. Mind the Gap? 
As we have seen, the gap between the socially resilient and the 
socially vulnerable in America is wide. Should we mind that? Let us 
return to Judith Shklar’s distinction between misfortune and injustice. 
Shklar says that an important difference between the two involves 
agency—if there is no causative and blameworthy agent, there can be 
no injustice.155 Part I demonstrates that social vulnerability is 
causative. Decades of research shows the sometimes determinative 
link that exists between social standing and a community’s level of 
disaster risk. Social vulnerability can decide whether you escape a 
flood or get stuck on the roof, whether your apartment building 
survives the quake or pancakes into a sinkhole, or whether your loved 
ones spend the night in a secure shelter or in the intensive care unit. 
Social scientists argue that by devoting more resources to 
reducing socioeconomic inequality and attending to the needs of 
vulnerable groups in times of disaster, government could reduce 
overall disaster risk.156 It seems plausible that in some cases we could 
reduce disaster risk more affordably by steering more of our risk-
reduction resources toward the social side of the equation. But does 
that mean that our current disaster policies, admittedly far from 
perfect, are blameworthy? Are they unjust? 
The question is more than a thought experiment. As long as our 
failure to adequately address social vulnerability is seen as 
misfortune, fixing the problem will be framed as one of the many 
things we should do to help needy people, but, because of other 
priorities, never get around to doing. But if our failure to protect the 
vulnerable is an injustice—a breach of democracy’s fundamental 
obligation to its citizens—the mission takes on an urgency that can be 
trumpeted in the press, agency planning sessions, and perhaps the 
courtroom. After two centuries, Mary Wollstonecraft is still right: “It 
is justice, not charity, that is wanting in the world!”157 
 
 155.  See supra Part I.A. (discussing role of agency). 
 156.  See, e.g., BULLARD & WRIGHT, supra note 91, at 279–311 (recommending that social 
factors be considered in a variety of disaster policies including those dealing with evacuation, 
health care, and financial risk); Cutter & Finch, supra note 129, at 110–12 (arguing for changes 
in “policies, procedures, and disaster protocols” based on a spatial understanding of social 
vulnerability). 
 157.  MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 71 (Carol H. 
Poston ed., 1975) (1792).  
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According to Shklar, inequality is the “fountain and origin” of 
injustice.158 For Susan Cutter, inequality is also the fountain and origin 
of social vulnerability,159 a central element of community hazard. But 
under U.S. law, not all inequality is necessarily unjust; sometimes it is 
just a misfortune. The argument for seeing social vulnerability as 
misfortune is pretty straightforward. Government, this thinking goes, 
owes similar expenditures to protect communities with similar 
geophysical vulnerabilities. But it owes no “special” duty for 
communities or individuals with extraordinary needs. It certainly 
owes no special obligation to correct social inequality simply for the 
sake of hazard mitigation. This argument is supported by a practical 
argument and a theoretical argument. The practical argument is that 
government works best by sector. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the agency devoted to natural hazard mitigation, is 
not equipped to offer special services for special social vulnerabilities. 
To do more would require more integration, more bureaucracy, and 
more federal involvement. Hazard mitigation is best managed from 
the local level. Federal officials are there to lend a hand, but not to re-
engineer the dynamics of local communities. 
The philosophical argument begins with the premise that in a 
democracy, the government’s job (among other things) is to enhance 
freedom. An important part of freedom requires that the government 
treat individuals in equal ways; but it does not require that the 
government ensure equal outcomes. So long as government does not 
intentionally discriminate against a person on the basis of a suspect or 
irrational classification, no injustice has been committed.160 Acts of 
commission, in this sense, may be unlawful. But acts of omission 
seldom are.161 
The response to the argument goes like this: A multifaceted 
social problem like disaster risk demands a multifaceted game plan. 
Sometimes attacking an issue on a single wavelength makes sense. 
But it is often inefficient and inadequate. Take automobile accidents, 
for example. Technological innovations like airbags and anti-lock 
 
 158.  SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 87.  
 159.  See Cutter & Finch, supra note 129, at 2305 (“Social vulnerability is born from 
inequality and its social and political consequences.”).  
 160.  See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the disproportionate 
impact of a facially neutral written employment test on African-Americans did not warrant a 
conclusion that the test was purposely discriminatory).  
 161.  See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that states have 
no constitutional duty to protect children from their parents after receiving reports of possible 
abuse).  
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brakes have helped bring traffic fatalities to an all-time low.162 But we 
have also worked on the social aspects of driving by tightening 
standards for teenagers, requiring infant car seats, and prosecuting 
more drunk drivers. To ignore drivers’ behavior would put more lives 
at risk and waste more time and money. This argument, based on 
utilitarianism (or “welfare economics”), forms the practical response. 
The theoretical response takes more unpacking. As 
contemporary thinkers have noted, Western philosophy has perused 
for centuries the face of justice in its ideal form.163 But it has devoted 
relatively little energy to identifying its opposite, injustice.164 Instead, 
we know injustice when we feel it. Injustice, writes Shklar, is “the 
special kind of anger we feel when we are denied promised benefits 
and when we do not get what we believe to be our due.”165 Though 
rooted in emotion, injustice remains “eminently political.”166 Thus in 
democratic theory, “the sense of injustice is taken to be an intrinsic 
part of our moral structure and an appropriate reaction to 
unwarranted social deprivation.”167 
Again, Rousseau must take credit for this insight. The petulant 
savant, known for his own thin skin, believed injustice was (as Shklar 
summarizes) “a universal human disposition, an iradicable social 
emotion and a politically significant phenomenon.”168 We instinctively 
reject injustice for ourselves, Rousseau argued. Through proper 
training, we grow to disdain its application to others as well.169 
Injustice often takes an active form, but inaction, as Justice William 
Brennan once wrote, “can be every bit as abusive of power.”170 
Echoing the voices of disaster victims everywhere, Shklar writes, “It is 
not the origin of the injury, but the possibility of preventing and 
reducing costs, that allows us to judge whether there was or was not 
unjustified passivity in the face of disaster.”171 Still, not every slight is 
 
 162.  Keith Barry, Safety in Numbers: Charting Traffic Safety and Fatality Data, CAR & 
DRIVER (Apr. 2011), http://www.caranddriver.com/features/safety-in-numbers-charting-traffic-
safety-and-fatality-data.  
     163.    AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 5–8 (2009).  
 164.  Id.; SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 84.  
 165.  SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 83.  
 166.  Id. at 83.  
 167.  Id. at 84.  
 168.  Id. at 86. 
 169.  Id. at 88.  
 170.  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 171.  SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 81.  
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an injustice: we need a way to distinguish between “socially validated 
expectations, mere fantasies, and unwarranted hopes.”172  
Of course, what counts as injustice changes over time. When, in 
1873, Myra Bradwell was denied the right to become an Illinois 
lawyer because she was a woman, the result, said the U.S. Supreme 
Court, was not an unjust indictment of her abilities, but rather her 
misfortune of having being been born female—a class of persons not 
legally capable of signing enforceable contracts.173 
To distinguish between a “validated expectation” and a 
fantasized “hope,” we need a perspective. Because the sense of 
injustice emerges from within the claimant naturally (according to 
Rousseau),174 it seems essential to begin any inquiry from the point of 
view of the claimant. The perspective is not dispositive. But, 
according to Shklar, “[g]iven the inevitability of the inequality of all 
kinds of power among us, [looking from the bottom up] is the 
necessary democratic response.”175 History, after all, has a tendency to 
blame the victim. Recall that Rousseau attributed Lisbon’s slow 
evacuation to pocket-stuffing clerks fleeing their homes.176 But aren’t 
you supposed to have cash and identification papers when you 
evacuate? When millions perished in Bengal’s 1943 famine, Winston 
Churchill scandalously blamed Indians for “breeding like rabbits,” 
instead of admitting his government’s incompetence.177 Since 
independence, a democratic India has yet to see another famine.178 
And when, in 2005, federally maintained levees burst and drowned 
the Crescent City, beset victims were forced to swallow a torrent of 
blame from moralizing Congressmen and agency officials.179 
 
 172.  Id. at 89.  
 173.  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 142 (1873) (holding that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the right to practice a 
profession); NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 
4–5 (2006) (describing reasoning in the opinion); see also SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 2 (arguing 
that in earlier times the harms of racial discrimination were seen not as an injustice against a 
person of color, but as a misfortune of not having been born white).  
 174.  SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 87.  
 175.  Id. at 90.  
 176.  See Dynes, supra note 18, at 106.  
 177.  MADHUSREE MUKERJEE, CHURCHILL’S SECRET WAR 205 (2010) (quoting Winston 
Churchill on the Bengal famine).  
 178.  AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 178 (1999).  
 179.  FEMA Chief: Victims Bear Some Responsibility, CNN.COM (Sept. 1, 2005), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-01/weather/katrina.fema.brown_1_mandatory-evacuation-death-
toll-relief-effort?_s=PM:WEATHER (“The director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency said Thursday those New Orleans residents who chose not to heed warnings to evacuate 
before Hurricane Katrina bear some responsibility for their fates.”); Arizona Talk Radio Brings 
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B. The Capability Approach 
Amartya Sen, the economist and Nobel laureate, is famous for 
his work on social inequality. His research has added greatly to the 
field of development economics and helped transform the way the 
United Nations Development Programme now measures levels of 
poverty and inequality around the world. The crux of his analysis 
centers on human “capability,” a concept he first introduced at 
Stanford University’s Tanner Lecture on Human Values in 1979.180 
Put simply, capability is a measure of what people can actually do and 
what they can actually become. 
Following the liberal tradition, Sen embraces personal freedom 
as society’s “basic building block[].”181 A society’s first goal, therefore, 
is to promote the enjoyment of personal freedom. But freedom 
without the resources to make real choices and to experience real 
consequences is an empty shell. True freedom, Sen argues, demands 
that all persons have the real-life capabilities to “lead the kind of lives 
they value—and have reason to value.”182 The capabilities approach 
has influenced research in several fields, from economics, to political 
science, to history.183 The approach has also inspired legal scholarship 
in such areas as property, health policy, corporate social 
responsibility, and environmental justice.184 
 
You Some Kindly Compassion, AZCENTRAL.COM (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.azcentral.com/ 
arizonarepublic/local/articles/0904polinsider04.html (quoting U.S. Senator Jon Kyl talking about 
the damages caused by Hurricane Katrina: “Because the question is if people know year after 
year after year a natural disaster occurs in a particular place and people continue to build there 
and want to live there, should they bear the responsibility of buying insurance or should 
everyone else bear the responsibility?”).  
 180.  Amartya Sen, Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford University, The 
Tanner Lecture on Human Values at Stanford University: Equality of What? (May 22, 1979) 
(transcript available at http://www.uv.es/~mperezs/intpoleco/Lecturcomp/Distribucion%20 
Crecimiento/Sen%20Equaliy%20of%20what.pdf).  
 181.  SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 18.  
 182.  Id.  
 183.  See, e.g., 2 ARGUMENTS FOR A BETTER WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF AMARYTA 
SEN (Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur eds., 2009) (presenting essays in these disciplines and 
others).  
 184.  See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2874–78 (2006) (property); James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that 
Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 72, 91–96 (2009) (property); Jedediah Purdy, A 
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1237, 1258–63 (2005) (property); JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
45–130 (2010) (health policy); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a 
New Paradigm of Health Ethics, Policy and Law, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 435–40 
(2006) (health policy); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of 
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 710 (2002) (corporate social 
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Politicians and philosophers will disagree on the margins about 
what a person’s bundle of capabilities must include.185 But at the very 
least all persons are entitled to such “elementary capabilities” as 
“being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, 
undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as 
well as . . . being literate and numerate, enjoying political 
participation and uncensored speech and so on.”186 The inclusion of 
democratic processes is vital—political participation is both an 
intrinsic value (it is a constituent of freedom) and a constructive 
means by which individuals can secure other aspects of freedom and 
set group norms for defining them.187 
Capabilities like these cannot be defined solely by affluence. This 
is because a person’s ability to lead a life of value depends not only on 
a level of income, but also on personal characteristics (disability, age, 
gender), environmental diversities (climatic circumstances, 
temperature ranges, rainfall, flooding, and such), variations in social 
climate (education, social networks, crime), and more.188 As anyone 
from the projects can tell you, it is expensive to be poor.189 Like 
utilitarianism, the capability approach is concerned with the 
outcome—with ensuring that all persons have the capability to lead 
lives they value and have reason to value. But in contrast to 
utilitarianism, this outcome is only worthy to the capability approach 
if it is a product of meaningful public participation. Like 
libertarianism, the capability approach is committed to equality. But 
unlike libertarianism, the equality sought is not equality of treatment 
or baseline opportunity, but the equality of capability—the real-world 
 
responsibility); Shannon M. Roesler, Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability 
Approach to Rulemaking, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 49 (2011) (environmental justice).  
 185.  Sen allows for this and in the past has taken heat for such obscurity. See SEN, THE 
IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 163, at 232–33 (noting that the capability approach can be applied 
in different ways depending on the policies being addressed and the data and other information 
available). For arguments that the capability approach suffers from vagueness, see Ingrid 
Robeyns, The Capability Approach in Practice, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 351, 353 (2006) (describing 
Sen’s capability approach as “radically underspecified”) and Thomas Pogge, Can the Capability 
Approach Be Justified?, 30 PHIL. TOPICS 167, 168 (2002) (arguing that Sen’s approach does not 
specify a criteria for assessing levels of relative injustice between institutions).  
 186.  SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 36.  
 187.  Id. at 37.  
 188.  Id. at 70.  
 189.  See, e.g., DeNeen L. Brown, The High Cost of Poverty, WASH. POST, May 18, 2009, at 
C01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/17/ 
AR2009051702053.html (“The poorer you are, the more things cost. More in money, time, 
hassle, exhaustion, menace.”).  
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means to lead a life that you have reason to value, free of extreme 
deprivations. Whether you choose that, or not, is up to you.190 
C. Human Capability and Disaster 
We see the capability approach in some aspects of American law 
and cultural norms. When the Americans with Disabilities Act 
requires a new building to be accessible to wheelchairs,191 the 
injunction reflects the belief that everyone, regardless of disability, is 
entitled to participate in community life free from unreasonable 
physical limitation. When the Clean Air Act requires regulators to set 
ambient air standards to protect “sensitive populations” like children 
or asthma sufferers,192 the glister of capability is on show. It is not 
enough that everyone gets to breathe the same air or even air 
healthful enough for most people (understanding that even this goal 
eludes us). But the air is required to be healthful enough to permit 
even those with special vulnerabilities to live a life that offers them 
experiences and choices they have reason to value. 
In the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout, a 
controversy involving Vietnamese-American fishers and BP’s 
compensation facility swung a spotlight on the issue of human 
capability against the backdrop of disaster. Louisiana is home to 
roughly 25,000 Vietnamese-Americans, most of them living near the 
Gulf Coast.193 Their communities, which grew out of the wave of 
refugees in the 1970s, are almost all economically dependent on 
fishing and crabbing.194 Indeed, it is estimated that thirty to fifty 
percent of all commercial fishers in the Gulf are of Vietnamese 
descent.195 In addition to supporting the local economy, fishing also 
nourished an array of reciprocal bonds among family, friends, and 
 
 190.  For a more detailed analysis of the capability approach in relation to utilitarianism and 
libertarianism, see SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 74–86.  
 191.  42 U.S.C. § 12183 (2012).  
 192.  Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“NAAQS must protect 
not only average healthy individuals, but also ‘sensitive citizens’-children, for example, or 
people with asthma, emphysema, or other conditions rendering them particularly vulnerable to 
air pollution.”).   
 193.  UNITED LA. VIETNAMESE AM. FISHERFOLKS & MQVN CMTY. DEV. CORP., LOSS OF 
SUBSISTENCE USE CLAIM FRAMEWORK & TEMPLATE 5, Dec. 2010 (policy paper submitted to 
Kenneth R. Feinberg, administrator of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility) (on file with DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.).   
 194.  Id. (noting that eighty percent of all Vietnamese-Americans in the region are 
connected to the seafood industry).   
 195.  Id. 
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business associates.196 Vietnamese-American fishers fed their families 
with their catch. They bartered it for fruits, vegetables, and other 
goods.197 A fisher might donate a recent haul to a spring festival or 
“pound” (that is, reward) the minister with tuna after a stirring 
sermon. At a wedding, the bride’s family might be showered with a 
hundred pounds of blue crab.198 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill devastated the fisheries that 
year and shattered those social bonds. Thousands of Vietnamese-
American subsistence fishers submitted claims to BP’s original 
compensation fund.199 But the claimants and the fund’s administrator, 
Kenneth Feinberg, could never agree on how the loss should be 
valued. Submitting documentation on their heritage and cultural 
history, many Vietnamese-Americans argued that their losses far 
exceeded the market value of self-caught seafood.200 Although they 
did not describe it this way, the claimants were talking about 
“capability.” To them a sack of crab was worth more than the 
personal nourishment or satisfaction that it brought (both of which 
are presumably reflected in the market price). The seafood also 
strengthened social institutions—institutions that reached out to 
families in times of crisis, that watched over the elderly and the 
infirm, and that increased the capability (and thus the freedom) of the 
community’s most vulnerable members. However, when claimants 
argued for compensation valued according to cultural significance, 
their requests fell on deaf ears.201 
The capability approach may yet claim victory. When, in the 
spring of 2012, BP and a class of private plaintiffs negotiated a 
settlement agreement, they carved out special terms for claims by 
 
 196.  Id. at 6.  
 197.  Jarvis DeBarry, Opinion, Vietnamese Fishers Struggle To Document for Feinberg Gifts 
They Gave from the Heart, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 21, 2010, 
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/12/vietnamese_fishers_struggle_to.html.  
 198.  Id.   
 199.  BP’s fund, officially named the Gulf Coast Claims Facility and administered by 
Kenneth Feinberg, has now been replaced by a court-administered settlement fund, created 
after an announced settlement between BP and a class of private plaintiffs, including many 
members of the Gulf’s Vietnamese-American community. John Schwartz, Accord Reached 
Settling Lawsuit over BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/us/accord-reached-settling-lawsuit-over-bp-oil-spill.html.   
 200.  See Douglas Kysar, There Are Ways to Put a Value on that Bartered Shrimp, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/12/ 
there_are_ways_to_put_a_value.html (noting resistance by the Gulf Coast Claims Facility to 
recognize subsistence loss claims based on cultural value). 
 201.  Id. 
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subsistence fishers. Under those terms, subsistence fishers would be 
eligible for 2.25 times the market-based loss, in acknowledgment of 
“damage to subsistence family and community customs and 
culture.”202 In Sen’s terms, this added compensation can be 
understood as an effort to help revive the community’s weakened 
social structures with economic stimulus. The “culture premium” 
could, if claimants so choose, be directly funneled back into the 
churches, preschools, nursing homes, and other community assets that 
together help residents live lives they have reason to value. 
Sen’s interests in development and human capability often lead 
him to the topic of natural disasters. In this subject, he is perhaps best 
known for his work on famines—events that can be triggered by 
droughts, storms, floods, and other phenomena.203 Disasters, after all, 
are one of the great threats to economic resilience in the developing 
world.204 And reducing a community’s risk (whether in a poor country 
or a rich one) strengthens a range of personal freedoms, most notably 
the freedoms from avoidable impoverishment, injury, and death. In 
his inquiries into famines and other “calamitous crises,”205 Sen’s 
campaign against injustice—at root, a humanistic journey in ethics—
ultimately leads him to some of the same insights we have seen 
promoted by geographers and other experts in the social sciences. 
Two are particularly important. 
First, like Susan Cutter and her colleagues, Sen emphasizes the 
connection between natural hazard and geographic, social, and 
economic circumstances.206 As an example, he offers data showing 
that during some of the worst famines in modern history, it was 
people’s inability to purchase or acquire food, rather than the physical 
 
   202. Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement as 
Amended on May 2, 2012 Ex. 9 at 2, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the 
Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. 2012). 
 203.  See, e.g., SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 163 (discussing the 
profound impact that exchange conditions can have on famine); SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 163, at 338–45 (explaining that famine generally does not occur in democracies). 
 204.  See FARBER ET AL., supra note 5, at 393 (noting that “Small Island Developing States 
and Land-Locked Developing Countries” experience “a particularly low resilience to loss, 
meaning that disaster losses can lead to major setbacks in economic development”).  
 205.  SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 188.  
 206.  Id. at 162–63. Sen focuses on the kinds of extreme events that lead to hunger and 
starvation, but repeatedly notes that his analysis applies to “famine and other crises” as well. See 
id. at 160–88. 
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availability of food that cost so many lives.207 The drought or flood 
that precipitates a poor harvest also throws people out of work and 
drives down monthly income. Thus, “famines and other crises thrive 
on the basis of severe and sometimes suddenly increased 
inequality.”208 For this reason, Sen is skeptical of famine prevention 
policies that rely only on expanding food production, stating that it “is 
like putting all the eggs in the same basket.”209 Instead, he favors a 
more comprehensive strategy that uses public investment to create 
emergency employment and that polices markets to make sure that 
food and labor are exchanged efficiently and fairly.210 
Second, Sen stresses the importance of a community’s 
infrastructure—in its social, built, and natural forms. This focus on 
the community may surprise some readers, who are more used to 
Sen’s regard for the individual. But the capability approach 
recognizes the value that individuals place on collaborating with 
others and taking part in common traditions and experiences.211 Sen is 
specifically aware of the importance of social networks and public 
health systems, not only for tempering community resilience, but also 
for strengthening individual capability.212 Sen also acknowledges the 
role that physical geography and ecosystem services play in shaping 
the capacity to enjoy personal freedoms.213 Geography is not destiny, 
but its thumb is on the scale. 
Sen offers a third insight, which is sometimes mentioned in the 
social science literature, but to which he gives full voice in his moral 
deliberations: the paramount necessity of democratic values. For Sen, 
the project of disaster-risk reduction is deeply linked to government 
transparency, political accountability, and the right to participate in 
 
 207.  See id. at 165 (discussing the Bangladesh famine of 1974, where although there was 
more food availability per capita, “starvation was initiated by regional unemployment caused by 
floods,” which lead to “immediate income deprivation of rural laborers”).  
 208.  Id. at 187.   
 209.  Id. at 177.  
 210.  See id. at 177–78 (noting that there are no famines in functioning democracies, which 
implies that equality in the marketplace aids in famine prevention).  
 211.  SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 163, at 246; see also Roesler, supra note 184, at 
76–77 (confirming that Sen recognizes the importance of collaboration in the capability 
approach).   
 212.  See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 19–20 (explaining that 
“income deprivations and capability deprivations have considerable correlational linkages,” and 
that better health helps individuals in their earning higher incomes).   
 213.  See id. at 70 (arguing that well-being and freedom are partially dependent on 
“environmental diversities,” such as “temperature ranges, rainfall, flooding and so on”). 
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administrative decisionmaking.214 Democracy, as noted earlier, is an 
inherent aspect of freedom. But it is also an important hedge against 
deprivation. Indeed, public approval or disapproval is an important 
measure of what justice demands. For without “consent,” to quote 
Shklar, “we have no reason to suppose that [people’s] legitimate 
expectations are being met.”215 
Consider famines. “[N]o substantial famine,” asserts Sen, “has 
ever occurred in a democratic country—no matter how poor.”216 He is 
right.217 Even young democracies in Botswana, Zimbabwe, and post-
colonial India have averted famine in the face of devastating harvests, 
while famines in Sudan and North Korea (to name just two examples) 
have unfurled repeatedly beneath the eyes of passive tyrants.218 As 
Sen explains: “Authoritarian rulers, who are themselves rarely 
affected by famines . . . tend to lack the incentive to take timely 
preventative measures. Democratic governments, in contrast, have to 
win elections and face public criticism, and have strong incentives to 
undertake measures to avert famines and other such catastrophes.”219 
Indeed, Sen has argued that “a free press and an active political 
opposition constitute the best early-warning system a country 
threatened by famines can have.”220 
The necessity of democratic process is surely most dramatic in 
poor countries, but that fact should not distract us from the 
importance of accountability and public participation when disaster 
strikes a rich nation. Let us look at the example of government 
compensation funds, an important aspect of the “recovery” stage in 
the Circle of Risk Management. 
D. An Example: Compensation Funds 
Government compensation funds are an important way of 
putting money into victims’ hands after a disaster so that they can 
begin the work of rebuilding their households and—just as 
important—repairing the social and economic infrastructure of the 
 
    214.    See id. at 180–86. 
 215.  SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 90–91.   
 216.  SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 51.    
 217.  See generally JAN-ERIK LANE & SVANTE ERSSON, DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 58 (2003).   
 218.  SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 16. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 181.   
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community.221 Government funds typically compensate individuals 
who have suffered certain injuries resulting from a natural or 
technological disaster, or, more recently, an act of terrorism. The 
money is appropriated by Congress and distributed through a no-fault 
administrative process.222 “As traditionally designed, compensation 
funds make no explicit distinction between vulnerable and 
nonvulnerable populations.”223 But because vulnerable populations 
are often more likely to be exposed to hazards, their susceptibility to 
harm is likely to be higher, and recovery is generally more difficult, 
compensation funds are especially relevant to those hoping to build 
resilience in a disadvantaged community.224 
Perhaps the best-known compensation fund in recent times is the 
September 11th Victims Compensation Fund. The fund, created ten 
days after the attack, compensated persons (many represented by 
their estates) who were present at the World Trade Center site and 
suffered physical injury or death.225 In exchange for an award, 
claimants agreed to waive their right to sue the airlines, the airline 
manufacturers, the city of New York, or other potential defendants.226 
Nearly all eligible claimants took part, and the fund paid out $7 
billion, with the average payment totaling $1.8 million per claimant. 
Two lesser-known compensation funds involve the Teton Dam 
breach in Idaho in 1976 and the Cerro Grande Fire in New Mexico in 
2000. In the first case, a federally constructed dam crumbled in 
eastern Idaho, unleashing waters that destroyed five downstream 
towns.227 Investigations blamed a flawed design and shoddy 
construction.228 Within a week, President Gerald Ford called on 
Congress to establish a multimillion-dollar compensation fund,229 and 
“[t]hrough a hastily assembled administrative claims process, 7500 
claims were settled for a total of $322 million.”230 The Cerro Grande 
 
 221.  I previously examined the compensation funds discussed here in VERCHICK, supra 
note 3, at 178–82.  
 222.  Id. at 178.  
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Id.  
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at 179.  
 228.  Id.  
 229.  Id. (“Gerald Ford requested a $200 million appropriation to start a victim’s 
compensation fund.”).  
 230.  Id.; see DYLAN J. MCDONALD, THE TETON DAM DISASTER (2006); Pierce O’Donnell, 
Leave No Katrina Victims Behind, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2008, 12:11 PM), 
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Fire occurred when a “controlled burn” conducted by the National 
Park Service in Bandelier National Monument burst out of control, 
destroying 43,000 acres and 400 homes.231 Two months later, Congress 
passed a multimillion-dollar compensation program intended “to 
compensate as fully as possible those parties who suffered injuries 
and damages from the Cerro Grande Fire.”232 
We can think of these funds as expressions of government 
accountability, instigated by public demand. Each of these events 
shocked the public conscience. The harm was so devastating and the 
victims so sympathetic; it seemed to many that government simply 
had to step in, which it did with uncharacteristic speed. Further, the 
likelihood of lawsuits against government actors or other entities 
suggests not only a desire to avoid protracted litigation, but also a 
kind of silent acknowledgement that perhaps government could have 
or should have done more to reduce the risk.233  
Along with others, I have sometimes wondered why a 
compensation fund was never established—or even considered—for 
New Orleans residents after Hurricane Katrina.234 In many ways, the 
case for a Katrina fund is compelling. Like the 9/11 attack, the New 
Orleans flood was jarring in both its scope and suddenness. Images 
from CNN and other broadcasters were seared into the public 
consciousness, making the destruction of this American city part of 
everyone’s history. Like the Teton Dam breach, the unchallenged 
evidence is that the New Orleans flood was caused by defects in 
design and construction of barriers that were at all times under the 
control of a federal agency.235 And these mistakes brought destruction 
 
www.huffingtonpost.com/pierce-odonnell/leave-no-katrina-victims_b_122396.html; The Teton 
Dam Failure Site, CTR. FOR LAND USE INTERPRETATION, http://www.clui.org/ludb/site/teton-
dam-failure-site (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  
 231.  VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 179. 
 232.  Disaster Assistance: Cerro Grande Fire Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,260, 52,260 (Aug. 
28, 2000) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. pt. 295).   
    233.   The case of 9/11 is complicated, but the disasters in Idaho and New Mexico clearly 
suggest this motive. 
 234.  See VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 179–82 (offering potential explanations for why 
Congress refused “to seriously consider a compensation fund for the victims of Katrina”); 
Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, supra note 5, at 317–19.  
 235.  See Mark Schleifstein, Corps Operation of MR-GO Doomed Homes in St. Bernard, 
Lower 9th Ward, Judge Rules, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 19, 2009, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2009/11/post_16.html (In a groundbreaking decision, a 
federal judge ruled that the Army Corps of Engineers' mismanagement of maintenance at the 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet was directly responsible for flood damage in St. Bernard Parish 
and the Lower 9th Ward after Hurricane Katrina.); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated 
Litigation, 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009).   
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upon a city with one of the highest concentrations of social 
vulnerability in the country. 
New Orleans was left out as a result of participation and 
accountability issues. From the beginning, the Katrina flood victims 
were limited in their ability to organize and exert political pressure on 
policymakers because of their social vulnerability, geographic 
dispersion, and, in the early days, lack of organized government. The 
families of 9/11 victims, in contrast, were, by and large, better 
educated, wealthier, and still living in intact households.236 In addition, 
Katrina victims did not appear to have a reasonable chance of 
recovering damages from the federal government because of the 
sweeping government immunity recognized for flood control 
projects.237 In contrast, as Daniel Farber notes, the families of 9/11 
victims “had a reasonable prospect of collecting massive tort damages 
against the airline industry, giving them political leverage.”238 
On top of all this, the American public seems to have been 
ambivalent about New Orleans’s victims almost from the very 
beginning. Many wondered why more people did not voluntarily 
evacuate (perhaps not understanding that poor neighborhoods have 
fewer cars), or why so many turned violent (they did not).239 A study 
of cognitive bias conducted after the storm by Stanford 
communications expert Shanto Iyengar even suggested that victims’ 
skin color may have had an unconscious effect on how generous 
members of the public thought the government should be.240 Without 
an organized community, legal leverage, or broad public support, the 
democratic process could not deliver the kind of accountability that it 
had in the past. Because democratic systems like ours are, in practice, 
more responsive to organization and money, securing a seat at the 
 
 236.  See Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, supra note 5, at 318 (noting differences in 
education, wealth, and “political clout”). 
 237.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently suggested that the immunity is not as 
complete as some had supposed. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 647 
F. Supp. 2d at 703 (discussing the discretionary function exemption to the Government’s waiver 
of sovereign immunity for personal injury claims under the FTCA). 
 238.  Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, supra note 5, at 319.  
 239. See Nicole M. Stephens, MarYam G. Hamedani, Hazel Rose Markus, Hilary B. 
Pergsieker & Liyam Eloul, Why Did They “Choose” to Stay?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 878, 878 (2009) 
(examining the perspectives of hurricane survivors and observers regarding evacuation); Lisa 
Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2011) (noting that 
media reports of lawlessness and violence were greatly exaggerated and that major news outlets 
eventually retracted many of these reports). 
 240.  VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 161. For a discussion of this and similar studies, see id. at 
160–64. 
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table and pursuing government accountability will usually be harder 
for the marginalized people who need it most. 
E. Resilience as Freedom 
Inequality, when it becomes a fountain of social vulnerability, is 
an injustice. We know this by looking (as Shklar suggests) at the lives 
of those on the society’s bottom rungs and imagining (as Sen 
instructs) the bundle of capabilities that any person would need to 
exercise freedom in the context of a disaster. At a minimum, we 
should agree that human freedom requires the capacity to avoid 
unnecessary property damage, injury, and death. In the face of 
disaster, human freedom requires resilience. 
The building blocks of resilience can take many forms. In the 
case of Latino populations escaping a California earthquake, 
resilience will demand robust communications systems in the Spanish 
language, assurances that evacuees accepting assistance will not be 
interrogated by immigration officials, and assurances that responders 
will be trained to understand their cultural perspectives and needs. 
Low-income communities have reason to expect housing and 
assistance programs that give them the same shot at finding a rental 
or rebuilding their home that other groups are offered. When 
subsistence fishers lose access to seafood, they have reason to expect 
compensation programs that value their losses in the terms in which 
they actually experience them. When government protection fails in a 
way that shocks the conscience, the possibility of special government 
compensation should not depend on how popular, well-connected, or 
lawyered-up the injured community is. 
Putting these words into practice is the hard part. While progress 
involves a million little fixes, we need some big-picture initiatives to 
forge a national commitment and provide tools for tackling the 
problem. The next Part takes up that challenge. 
III.  FIGHTING INJUSTICE WHILE FACING DISASTER 
A. General Principles 
What happens when we join disaster’s social turn with a vision of 
injustice based on capability? The social turn teaches that 
government’s role is broader than it first appears. Building resilience, 
a job the government already accepts, is more than an exercise in 
steel and concrete. As the social science literature shows, reducing 
community risk entails not just good engineering, but also relieving 
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the burdens of social vulnerability. The capability approach teaches 
that the job of building resilience—and thus the job of reducing social 
vulnerability—is more than a politician’s kind turn, more than 
charity; it is the obligation of a free society. To fail to provide it is an 
injustice. 
The commitment to social resilience means more than refusing to 
intentionally discriminate against a disfavored group, or promising not 
to make social inequality any worse than it is today. It requires 
identifying the places where social vulnerability exists and improving 
the real-life capabilities of all the people living there. Always, we 
should remember, as Douglas Kysar has said, that human beings are 
more than “resources to be managed.”241 Residents must be involved 
in the decisions affecting their communities, both as a means of 
preserving their integrity and protecting their interests. 
Pursuing disaster justice along these terms requires 
mainstreaming and collaboration. By “mainstreaming,” I mean 
incorporating the consideration of social vulnerability into every 
major decision that an official or agency makes in the course of 
planning for, responding to, compensating for, or recovering from a 
disaster. In the Circle of Risk Management, boosting social resilience 
must be “business as usual.” We must move beyond so-called 
“hazard-by-hazard” planning to a more comprehensive strategy that 
incorporates cumulative and synergistic exposures and vulnerabilities. 
By “collaboration,” I mean that agencies across sectors (emergency 
response, environment, public health, and so forth) and governments 
at all levels (local, state, tribal, federal) must forge alliances to engage 
public participation, share information and technology, develop 
policy initiatives, achieve desired outcomes, and make themselves 
accountable. 
Much of this work will require new government initiatives, two 
of which I will discuss below. But lawyers and policymakers should 
keep in mind that some existing laws may already provide the 
“foothold” needed to propel the next leap forward.242 For instance, 
the Stafford Act,243 which dictates how federal resources can be used 
in responding to major disasters, contains new “post-Katrina” 
provisions requiring “equitable” treatment on the basis of race, color, 
 
 241.  DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 250 (2010).  
 242.  See Verchick & Hall, supra note 17, at 2223–30 (describing how provisions of existing 
law can be used to further new policy objectives).  
 243.  42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2012).  
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religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, and 
economic status.244 It also requires state and local governments to 
develop evacuation plans that take vulnerable populations into 
account, though implementation on that front has been uneven.245 
Agency planning efforts to adapt to climate change might also open a 
window for building social resilience, as White House principles for 
such efforts put priority on addressing the needs of vulnerable 
populations and engaging public participation.246 
But the best way to move forward would be for the federal 
government to formally commit to improving social resilience and to 
begin building the tools to make it happen. The first approach might 
take the form of a federal executive order. The second requires a 
nationally consistent disaster-justice mapping tool. The two would 
work best in tandem. But either could be initiated without the other 
for the sake of getting started. 
B. An Executive Order on Disaster Justice 
Elsewhere, I have proposed a federal “Executive Order on 
Disaster Justice” as a way of mainstreaming social resilience into 
disaster policy and encouraging horizontal and vertical 
collaboration.247 Patterned after the Executive Order on 
Environmental Justice,248 this new order would require federal 
agencies to consider disaster justice in all policies and activities 
related to all points on the Circle of Risk Management. Agencies 
would be required to identify, address, and protect against conditions 
that result in disproportionate or serious adverse effects on 
vulnerable populations, including minorities, women, children, the 
 
 244.  42 U.S.C. § 5151 (2008); see also Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, supra note 5, at 
310–11 (discussing anti-discrimination features of the Stafford Act); VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 
172–73. 
 245.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-44, TRANSPORTATION-
DISADVANTAGED POPULATIONS:  ACTIONS NEEDED TO CLARIFY RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
INCREASE PREPAREDNESS FOR EVACUATIONS 5 (2006); see also VERCHICK supra note 3, at 
172 (recommending private right of action to force implementation). 
 246.  WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE 
INTERAGENCY CLIMATE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN SUPPORT 
OF A NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGY 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency-Climate-Change-
Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf.   
 247.  VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 177. 
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Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
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elderly, the disabled, non-English speakers, undocumented persons, 
and the poor. 
An executive order on disaster justice would also require FEMA 
to create an advisory committee charged with developing uniform 
standards and methodologies for agencies to use in carrying out the 
order’s mandate. It could require all agencies to consider the 
consequences their actions might have on ease of evacuation, the 
vulnerability of important facilities, and the stability of natural 
barriers like wetlands or forests. The advisory committee would 
include some representation from vulnerable communities and would 
seek out viewpoints from such communities through hearings or other 
outreach efforts. The methodologies adopted would also emphasize 
the role of community participation in implementing the order’s 
goals. Ideally, such an order would include annual agency reporting 
requirements, perhaps reviewed by the White House Office of 
Management and Budget to make sure it gets done. 
C. A Disaster Justice Mapping Tool 
A comprehensive approach to disaster justice requires a 
nationally consistent mapping tool that combines local aspects of 
geophysical vulnerability with local aspects of social vulnerability. 
General knowledge of the physical and social characteristics of 
disaster risk is not enough.249 We need to know where socially 
vulnerable populations are located, how close they are to fault lines 
and flood threats, and what resources (public and private) might be 
available to build more resilience. 
This mapping tool, perhaps maintained at FEMA, would reside 
on a common agency platform, but draw from information already 
available from the U.S. Census Bureau, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the USGS, and other agencies. It would also integrate 
information collected locally. Crucially, the design of the tool would 
be open to public participation, allowing for local communities to 
contribute their ideas and concerns about what data and what 
community characteristics should be included. The tool would be 
flexible, allowing a user to “overlay” maps of various kinds to home 
in on a particular concern. You might, for instance, be interested in 
 
 249.  See Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 110–11 (emphasizing the need for specific 
“knowledge about who the most socially vulnerable people are within a population and where 
those less resilient reside”).  
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mapping areas of high poverty, or areas that contain hazardous waste 
facilities or flood plains. Ideally, the tool would be used across all 
federal agencies and capable of being incorporated into the mapping 
platforms of other agencies. The tool would also be accessible to 
officials in local, state, and tribal governments, and (in some form) to 
the public. 
Such a mapping tool could be used by government agencies at all 
levels and at each stage of the Circle of Risk Management. At the 
planning stage, city officials could use such information to help direct 
resources to projects like managing storm water or reducing the heat 
island effect. Such information could also be incorporated into state 
and federal grant programs. FEMA could also include social 
vulnerability measures in its standards for community hazard 
mitigation plans. That move alone could improve the mitigation 
strategies of tens of thousands of municipalities.250 At the response 
stage, first responders at the local and federal levels could use social-
vulnerability maps to identify populations in need of special attention. 
Government compensation funds or rebuilding programs could use 
the data to create fairer mechanisms to distribute money to the most 
deserving or to those most in need. At the recovery stage, a national 
mapping tool could identify neighborhoods in need of special 
outreach or capacity building as communities prepare to engage the 
democratic process of rebuilding or redesigning affected areas. Maps 
like these would not only pull together the geophysical and social 
aspects of disasters, which we might think of as horizontal elements of 
the challenge. Because they would be designed for use at the federal, 
state, and local levels, these maps would also tie together the many 
government actors that align on the vertical axis, making the project 
more comprehensive. Federal policy would not be “one size fits all,” 
because the tool would incorporate local data at every point.251 
The project sounds daunting, but we already have a head start. 
Susan Cutter’s work on SoVI provides one template for such an 
approach, although ideally, physical and social characteristics would 
be identified at a higher resolution than the county level. In addition, 
the EPA is developing a uniform environmental justice mapping tool 
 
 250.  Verchick & Hall, supra note 17, at 2245 (“Tens of thousands of communities maintain 
hazard mitigation plans approved by FEMA”). For a discussion of how hazard mitigation plans 
can be used to encourage sustainability, climate adaptation, and other federal priorities, see id. 
at 2244–47 (describing a federal pilot project involving recovery after Iowa’s 2008 floods).  
 251.  See Cutter & Emrich, supra note 70, at 110–11 (noting importance of local information 
in federal policy making).   
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that could become the basis for such an effort. The EPA’s proposed 
tool, an important part of its “Plan EJ 2014” strategy,252 would 
combine its many internal screening tools and other Geographic 
Information System (GIS) applications into a single, coordinated 
“GeoPlatform” that could be used to identify overlaps of 
environmental hazards and certain characteristics of social 
vulnerability.253 While full details are not yet available, such a 
screening tool could theoretically be used to identify social and 
environmental “hotspots” where additional resources like technical 
assistance or enforcement activities should be directed. 
GIS applications like these have direct application to disaster 
response. During clean up activities following the BP Blowout, the 
EPA and other agencies used a variety of mapping tools, including 
EPA’s EJView application, to understand how factors related to 
health, environmental exposure, and demographics were affecting 
local communities.254 The applications helped “identify locations of 
overburdened communities in comparison to areas of waste disposal, 
pinpoint locations where oil had reached the shore, and identify 
locations of community centers where people could get assistance.”255 
D. The Voice of Injustice 
These two strategies—a solidifying executive order and a 
nationally consistent GIS mapping tool—might strike some readers as 
disappointingly “top down.” That is fine. There is plenty of room for 
more ideas to bloom—from the bottom and the top and the middle. 
But at some point in the early stage we will need a framework of 
national dimensions. And we will need a set of reliable geophysical 
and demographic data to inform all of the proposals and policy 
visions that later follow. Shklar had it right: “When the victims of 
disasters refuse to resign themselves to their misfortunes and cry out 
in anger, we hear the voice of the sense of injustice.”256 Now it is time 
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